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ABSTRACT 
 
After describing the intellectual property and regulatory environment for orphan 
drugs in the United States, this thesis compares the investment decisions in the orphan 
drug market with the larger pharmaceutical industry. A series of case studies trace the 
development paths of different orphan products using information collected through the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Drug Product and Orphan Drug Product 
Designation Databases. In addition to this analysis, difference-in-differences estimates 
calculated using annual revenues compare the relative success of different orphan 
products under the current incentive system. This study finds that partial orphan drugs are 
associated with larger revenue growth. Lastly, this study proposes several policy 
prescriptions as alternatives to the current legislation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Orphan drugs treat rare medical conditions or illnesses, labeled as orphan 
diseases. These drugs gain Orphan Drug Entity (ODE) status from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) if they affect 200,000 people or fewer in the United States, or if 
they affect more than 200,000 people, but are not expected to recover the costs of 
development through sales in the U.S. (Code of Federal Regulations, 2014). 
Historically, rather than focus on orphan drugs, pharmaceutical companies have 
focused their attention on “blockbuster” drugs or “me too” drugs. The former describes 
drugs treating common conditions that are estimated to generate revenues greater than $1 
billion annually (Hannigan et al., 2013) and the latter describes incremental advances on 
existing medications (OTA, 1993). The massive profits earned, from holding patents for 
either of these drugs, allowed sponsors to recover their initial Research & Development 
(R&D) investment. While these profits incentivize drug investment, stalled innovation 
and the neglect of important New Molecular Entities (NME) or orphan drugs may occur 
as a result.  
The small demand and low expected returns in the orphan drug market help 
explain the historically low investment in R&D towards treatments for neglected 
diseases. In recent years this has begun to change, as there is increasing attention being 
devoted towards orphan diseases in the United States. The National Institutes of Health 
(NIH, 2014) estimates that there are roughly 6,000 to 7,000 rare diseases in existence, 
affecting approximately 25-30 million Americans, with around 250 new orphan diseases 
discovered annually (Seoane-Vazquez, E. et al., 2008). This equates to roughly 10% of 
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the population. Therefore, the orphan drug market presents a large, untapped, and 
potentially an economically viable opportunity for pharmaceutical companies.  
Seen by the number of orphan drugs that are now available, it is clear that 
investment in orphan drugs has increased significantly since 1983. At the same time, 
orphan diseases have become a public health need and a focus of public policy 
discussions. Moreover, as a result of large research funds and grants to drug 
manufacturers, there is new knowledge available of treatments for rare diseases. Patient 
advocacy groups have focused on other tactics to enhance their funding, such as 
marketing orphan drugs for ethical and moral attention. In addition to policy changes, as 
blockbuster patents expire and generic competition enters the market, pharmaceutical 
companies look to other R&D investment opportunities. These changes result from either 
a change in the expected costs or returns to orphan drugs. Certain policy makers argue 
that the increased attention towards orphan drugs is still insufficient and that investment 
will continue to be slow unless there are policy changes. Although several policy 
prescriptions have been enacted in an effort to stimulate orphan drug investment, the 
actual effect of these methods is unclear. 
In order to establish a baseline of the existing policies surrounding orphan drugs 
in the United States, this paper first discusses the development of the modern 
pharmaceutical industry and The Orphan Drug Act (ODA) passed in 1983. With the 
regulatory framework in mind, this paper analyzes the literature surrounding the 
economics of the pharmaceutical R&D process, focusing on the costs and benefits. 
Afterwards, this paper discusses the regulatory “push” and “pull” incentive mechanisms 
used within public policy to spark orphan drug development. Drawing from this 
3 
 
discussion, case studies of specific orphan drugs model how particular incentive 
mechanisms apply to orphan drug development. In addition to the case studies is an 
economic analysis of the returns to these particular orphan drugs, under the current 
legislation. Lastly, in light of these findings, this paper proposes alternative mechanisms 
to incentivize R&D investment in orphan drugs. 
 
 
 
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
THE BIRTH OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Records of the first medical patents appear in the United States in1796 (Worthen, 
2003). Prior to the establishment of a modern patent system in the pharmaceutical 
industry, drug manufacturers often chose not to patent their inventions in order to keep 
their medicinal formulas secret. It was not until the latter half of the 19th century and 
beginning of the 20th century that the modern patent system really came into existence. 
After treatments for large populations impacted by infectious diseases became patentable 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), medical therapy changed. In 
order to compete, drug manufacturers focused on these patentable products for large 
markets that would yield high profits and allow them to pursue future R&D. The modern 
patent system was born. Today, drug manufacturers disclose their complete chemical 
formulas to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), hoping for approval in order to 
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obtain the exclusive and legal right over the underlying patented drug for a 20-year 
period. 
 
 
20th CENTURY PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The early 20th century brought issues of drug safety. An outbreak of toxic 
chemicals led to the deaths of many Americans. This helped speed passage of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act in 1938. The FD&C Act required the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to oversee the safety and appropriateness of 
food products, drugs, and cosmetics. Soon after, incidents of contaminated drugs causing 
birth defects sparked a public demand for increased drug safety (Public Law No. 112-
144, 1938). In 1962 Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Bill as an amendment to the 
FD&C Act to clarify and strengthen the FDA approval process by assuring that approved 
drugs were safe, effective, and reliable (PL No. 87-781, 1962). The bill required those 
filing a New Drug Application (NDA) to submit rigorous clinical studies to the FDA, in 
order to show the effectiveness and safety of a new drug before it could be approved (PL 
No. 87-781, 1962). In addition, new advertisements were required to include information 
about side effects and drug sponsors were prohibited from marketing generic drugs under 
new trade names (PL No. 87-781, 1962). 
While drug safety improved under the new legislation, the costs associated with 
drug development skyrocketed. This was mainly due to the expensive clinical study 
requirements and the longer development time in the approval process. Heightened costs 
of developing a new drug resulted in a substantial “lag” in time until drugs were able to 
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reach the market (Henninger, 2002), which resulted in the death of many individuals who 
could not outlive the approval process (Wardell, 1978; Gieringer, 1985; Kazman, 1990). 
Asbury (1992) estimates that development time increased by at least two years and five 
years on average. This resulted in less new drugs being created (i.e. drug loss), because 
after the 1962 Amendment, many of the development costs exceeded the potential 
revenues. According to Asbury (1992)1, the average R&D costs per drug grew by 
approximately $49.3million, from $4.7 million prior to the bill, to $54 million in 1976 
dollars. 
 
 
ORPHAN DRUG POLICY SHIFT 
The regulations resulting from the FD&C Act and the 1962 Amendment had 
especially negative consequences for orphan drugs. Because orphan drugs target small 
populations and yield lower returns, Asbury (1992) finds only four drugs that were on the 
market to treat rare diseases by 1965. Legislation significantly increased the costs 
associated with drug development and caused pharmaceutical companies to focus their 
attention on drugs that would maximize profits and the possibility of recouping their 
R&D costs.  
In an effort to facilitate development of products treating rare diseases, the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), under the influence of the National Cancer Institute 
(NCI), began to fund testing for what they believed were promising products. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This estimate is based off of the research performed by (Hansen, 1979). His sample 
included NMEs that were tested in humans between 1963 and 1975 from 14 drug 
manufacturers. He estimated the average development costs to be $54 million using data 
of costs and development times for each NME. 
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Additionally, patient organizations for rare, specific diseases began to form in the 1970s. 
These groups supported research and vocalized orphan drugs as a public health issue. 
Research funding led to the discovery of treatments for these diseases, yet many 
pharmaceutical companies continued to invest elsewhere. For this reason, many people 
considered rare diseases to be “orphaned” or essentially ignored by drug manufacturers, 
due to the focus on profitable “blockbuster” treatments, defined as drugs that are 
expected to generate over $1 billion in sales annually (Hannigan et al., 2013). Because of 
their neglect, these treatments earned the label “orphan drug”. Eventually, the influence 
of non-governmental organizations, like the National Organization for Rare Disorders 
(NORD) and patient advocacy groups, made orphan drug development a focus of public 
policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1980 Congress implemented the Bayh-Dole 
Act (PL No. 96-517, 1984), allowing the recipients of government sponsored R&D to 
patent and license their research, followed by the Orphan Drug Act in 1983 (PL No. 97-
414, 1983). 
 
 
THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT (ODA) OF 1983 
Before the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) of 1983, the FDA had approved only 58 
orphan designations, with fewer than 10 approved in the decade before the ODA was 
passed (PhRMA, 2013). After the ODA, existing drugs that qualified had to be re-
approved in order to gain market exclusivity and the benefits of the Act. The ODA 
includes specific regulations that were developed to promote R&D investment in orphan 
drugs. The ODA has several parts but its main purpose is to reduce costs and increase the 
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returns to orphan drug production. The ODA allows drug sponsors to obtain 
recommendations from the FDA pertaining to the clinical and nonclinical trials of a drug 
before its approval, helping advance the development and approval process (PL No. 97-
414, 1983). Additionally, the ODA allows the FDA to expedite orphan drug designation 
approvals over other drugs, reducing the development time. The ODA also established a 
grant program in which subsidies are given to drug manufacturers, to a total of about 
$30,000,000 each fiscal year. This helps cover some of the costs of clinical trials (PL No. 
97-414, 1983).2 Furthermore, fees are often waived for drug manufacturers whose 
revenues are less than $50 million (PL No. 97-414, 1983). 
In 1997 Congress made a 50% tax credit on R&D expenditures a permanent 
feature of the Act. This credit goes towards clinical trial expenses of drugs that have 
received official orphan drug status by the FDA (IRS, 2015).3 The most contested 
provision of the ODA is the seven years of market exclusivity rights that pharmaceutical 
companies can obtain for orphan products, which grants them a monopoly over the 
marketing of the drug for a particular indication. The next chapter discusses the market 
exclusivity provision in further detail. 
Since the implementation of the ODA in 1983, Congress has amended the Act 
numerous times. Initially, orphan status was only granted to drug manufacturers that 
demonstrated that the development of an orphan drug would be unprofitable and the costs 
would not be recouped through US sales (Angeles Villarreal, 2001). Orphan drugs could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The subsidies under the FD&C Act subsidies reduce the costs of Phase I and Phase III 
during the clinical testing periods. For complete descriptions of Phase I and Phase III turn 
to Chapter 8 Glossary. For more information on orphan drug grants see program website 
[http://www.fda.gov/orphan/grants/index.htm]. 
3 Complete IRS Orphan Tax Credit form here [http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-8820,-
Orphan-Drug-Credit]. 
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be profitable through worldwide sales as long as there were no “reasonable expectation” 
that US sales would exceed the development costs (PL No. 97-414, 1983). To prove this 
reasonable expectation, pharmaceutical companies were required to submit financial 
information to the IRS. After drug manufacturers lobbied against the requirement, the 
ODA was amended in 1984 to grant orphan status for drugs having fewer than 200,000 
potential US patients at the time of the request for designation OR that there were no 
reasonable expectation that the costs would be recovered from sales of the drug in the 
US.  
Initially, orphan drug exclusivity status was restricted to drugs that could not be 
patented, as some biotech drugs had difficulty in obtaining patents. However, in 1985 
another amendment to the ODA dropped that restriction. In reality, most orphan products 
could obtain patents, but it was because of the lengthy approval process that many of the 
patents expired before the product was able to reach the market, making them redundant 
(Angeles Villarreal, 2001).  
In 1990 congress passed a proposal to limit market exclusivity, but President 
George H. W. Bush vetoed the amendment (Angeles Villarreal, 2001). Most recently, the 
FDA amended the ODA on June 12, 2013 in an effort to “clarify, streamline, and 
improve the orphan drug designation process” (CFR, 2014).4  
 
RECENT LEGISLATION 
The US continued to pass legislation extending exclusivity periods in an effort to 
strengthen drug development incentives. From 1983 until 2002, four opportunities for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Full Orphan Drug Final Rule of June 12, 2013 here [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2013-06-12/pdf/2013-13930.pdf].  
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market exclusivity passed through legislation in the US: NCE exclusivity, clinical 
investigation exclusivity, orphan drug exclusivity, and pediatric exclusivity. The Center 
for Drug Research and Evaluation (CDRE) and the FDA were granted the authority to 
decide which categories drug sponsors were eligible for. 
The Hatch-Waxman Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (PL No. 98-417, 1984) established an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). 
This relieved drug manufacturers from the burden of establishing the safety or efficacy of 
an already approved drug, only requiring that they show bioequivalence (PL No. 98-417, 
1984). In addition, the Act granted market exclusivity for sponsors of New Chemical 
Entity (NCE) drugs and market exclusivity for sponsors that conduct clinical trials to 
improve upon products already on the market. The FDA approves NCE exclusivity for 
drugs that contain a new “active moiety,” or substance that has not already been approved 
by the FDA, for up to five years (Hathaway et al., 2009). The FDA will grant an 
additional three years of Clinical Investigation (CI) exclusivity to drug manufacturers 
after they sponsor further clinical testing for an approved drug that results in a change in 
the product, supplemental, or an approved NDA (Hathaway et al., 2009). This includes 
new dosage forms, new indications and the change from prescription to over the counter 
(OTC). Furthermore, the clinical trials must be completely new, essential to the product’s 
approval, and not a bioavailability study. 
In 1997, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 
(FDAMA, 1997). Section 111 of the FDAMA established the Best Pharmaceuticals for 
Children Act in 2002. This offers an additional six months of market exclusivity to drug 
sponsors who conduct pediatric clinical studies on new drugs or drugs already marketed 
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under an exclusivity provision (PL No. 105-115, 1997). These additional months of 
exclusivity are granted after the other forms of exclusivity have expired to manufacturers 
who have produced useful information about the drug’s safety and effectiveness in 
children through the clinical studies (Hathaway et al., 2009). While the study does not 
have to be successful in order to obtain exclusivity, the study must meet the FDA’s 
requirements for evaluating effectiveness and safety. 
 
 
 
 
III. THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND ORPHAN DRUGS 
 
This section provides an overview of the economics of the pharmaceutical 
industry in order to understand the incentives behind developing pharmaceutical 
products. The demand for pharmaceutical products is largely dependent upon the present 
and future prevalence of the disease(s) or condition(s) that the product treats. The supply 
of pharmaceutical products depends upon whether the expected returns will cover the 
anticipated costs. Most of the available research surrounding the pharmaceutical 
industry focuses on incentives and disincentives in drug production. The incentives are 
mainly the returns to the R&D generated by the drug product’s sales. Disincentives 
include scientific, regulatory, and economic uncertainty. More specifically, the monetary 
costs of R&D, the time cost of R&D, and the risk of failure. After examining the economic 
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characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, this section examines the 
economic characteristics of the orphan drug market.  
 
 
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D COSTS 
In the pharmaceutical industry first mover advantages are small and second mover 
advantages are big. This is because costs of innovation are extremely high relative to the 
costs of imitation. The pharmaceutical R&D process demands a large, up front, sunk cost 
to discover, develop, and get a drug approved a drug by the FDA. In addition, there is 
uncertainty of whether the FDA will ultimately approve the drug. In contrast, the 
marginal cost of producing a drug that has already successfully gone through the 
approval process, a generic or drug with Therapeutic Equivalence (TE), is much lower.  
The actual estimates of the R&D costs associated with each new pharmaceutical 
drug vary widely. DiMasi et al. performed two similar studies, one in 1991 and another in 
2003, focusing on the costs associated with developing New Molecular Entity (NME) 
drugs. Their choice to focus on NME classifications is important, because this allows 
them to isolate the costs of developing novel drugs, essentially the most therapeutically, 
medically, and economically significant of classifications assigned by the FDA.  
The 1991 study examines a sample of 93 NME’s from twelve pharmaceutical 
firms (DiMasi et al. 1991). The authors find that the average cost of R&D for the 93 
drugs is $114 million, after including estimates of the risk of failure in each phase of the 
drug development process, which they include as the preclinical and clinical success rates 
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of 23%.5 The average cost reaches $231 million after adjusting for the opportunity cost of 
the investment until the FDA approves the drugs for marketing, at a 9% discount rate 
(DiMasi et al., 1991). Similarly, the 2003 study looks at the average R&D costs for a 
sample of 68 drugs from ten pharmaceutical firms (DiMasi et al., 2003). The average cost 
is over $400 million, which includes the money spent on discovery, the preclinical and 
clinical stages, as well as estimates of the cost of failures (DiMasi et al., 2003). Like the 
previous study, they adjust for the opportunity cost of the investment over time (until the 
FDA approves the drugs for marketing), at a discount rate of 11%, realizing a cost of 
$802 million (DiMasi et al. 2003). A comparison of the two studies performed by DiMasi 
et al. (1991; 2003) shows that they estimate that in roughly a decade, the R&D costs 
associated with pharmaceuticals more than tripled, increasing from $231 million to $802 
million. 
Other estimates, like those of Adams and Brantner (2006), are in the same general 
range as DiMasi et al. (2003). Adams and Brantner (2006) estimate that each new drug 
produced costs more than $800 million in R&D. Some estimates are much greater; the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) estimates in their 2013 report for 
the biopharmaceutical industry that developing a new drug costs $1.2 billion (PhRMA, 
2013). Other estimates by Mestre-Ferrandiz et al. (2012) find that by 2002, costs had 
increased from $199 million in the 1970s to an estimated $1.9 billion.6 The “PhRMA 
Annual Membership Survey” shows just how large the industry wide spending is, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The estimates calculated in DiMasi et al. (1991; 2003) are calculated without adjusting 
for inflation. 
6 The costs described in this study are estimated in terms of 2011 prices. 
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reporting that R&D spending by PhRMA members reached $48.5 billion in 2012 
(PhRMA, 2013). 
While these numbers are large, it is important to recognize that most of these 
studies are performed by or include data submitted by the pharmaceutical companies 
themselves. It may be in their interest to over-estimate the costs. Some studies find these 
estimates to be vastly overstated, and claim that most of the literature on drug 
development costs is subject to this source bias. For example, the study by DiMasi et al. 
(2003) was performed at the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development in Boston. 
While the authors claim to have received no external funding, critics such as Light & 
Warburton (2011) find that the study may be subject to source bias and reveal inflated 
costs. In addition to this conflict of interest, the values DiMasi et al. (2003) use to 
estimate the costs of failed projects and the discount rates used to estimate opportunity 
costs could be overestimated.  
Light and Warburton (2011) review the methodology of the two studies 
performed by DiMasi et al. (1991; 2003), critique their cost and risk estimates, and 
highlight the problems with the sample selection and the data used. After constructing a 
similar study to DiMasi et al. (2003), Light and Warburton (2011) estimate that, until the 
final clinical trials, the costs of developing a new drug and the associated risks are much 
lower. They find that the R&D per new drug costs pharmaceutical companies $59 million 
on average and a median of $43.4 million, significantly less than their predecessor’s 
estimates (Light and Warburton, 2011). They also note that this investment is generally 
recovered within the first 18 months of producing the drug (Light and Warburton, 2011). 
Light (2006) finds that 84.2% of all funds for discovering new medicines come from 
14 
 
public sources, and therefore the actual costs of research are unknown and highly 
variable. Moran (2005) and the Pharmaceutical R&D Policy Project (2005) and Light 
(2010) also present similar findings suggesting that the costs reported by the 
pharmaceutical industry are significantly overestimated. 
A report by Baker & Chatani (2002) helps explain why the reported costs of 
industry-wide research may appear so large. They find that the reported costs include 
research spent on “copycat” drugs rather than effectively useful research. Specifically, 
they find the amount of wasteful research was between $4.9billion and $17.6 billion in 
the year 2000 (Baker & Chatani, 2002). They also find that the additional costs of 
developing new drugs are mostly legal costs, such as the first to file for a patent and the 
costs of defending it, as well as the cost of advertising and capturing the market over a 
generic or cheaper drug (Baker & Chatani, 2002).  
Similarly, a study by Boldrin & Levine (2008) points to inclusion of “me-too” 
drugs in explaining the overestimated total R&D costs. “Me-too” drugs are not 
considered to be NME, because they are drugs with an almost identical structure to an 
already known drug (OTA, 1993). According to Boldrin & Levine (2008), “me-too” 
drugs account for roughly 75% of all R&D costs. Morgan et al. (2005) also find that most 
pharmaceutical R&D is spent on drugs with little therapeutic benefit, rather than for 
breakthrough drugs that are substantial improvements. Including the costs of clinical 
trials or “me-too” drugs in the overall R&D cost estimates may be misleading, because 
these costs do not consist of basic research alone. A survey conducted by the US National 
Science Foundation (NCSES) (2003) found that pharmaceutical firms invest 12.4% of 
gross domestic sales on R&D. Of this 12.4%, 18% or 2.4% of sales goes towards basic 
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research (NCSES, 2003). Another report by Light (2006) indicates that the percentage of 
R&D going towards basic research is even smaller, about 9.3% (1.2% of sales). 
“Me-too” drugs assume the majority of the costs because they are easier to 
produce than NME’s. Imitators can free ride on the existing R&D, they require only a 
fraction of the production costs, and they have a faster approval process. Innovator costs 
include the risk of toxicity, carcinogenicity, manufacturing difficulties, inconvenient 
dosing characteristics, inadequate efficacy, or other economic and competitive factors, 
that the production of “me-too” drugs avoids (Grabowski, 2005). However for these exact 
reasons, “me-too” drugs are not an accurate estimate of the cost of developing a new, 
scientifically meritorious drug, and including these drugs raises the overall estimates 
(Boldrin & Levine, 2008).  
Another explanation for exaggerated costs of R&D is the inclusion of the clinical 
trial costs. After the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendment was passed, the size, complexity, 
number of trials, and overall costs of clinical development increased rapidly. Grabowski 
(2002) explains that during this time the focus shifted towards chronic and degenerative 
diseases that had larger and longer trials and required testing on thousands of patients 
(Grabowski, 2002). As a result, according to Grabowski (2002), clinical trials mostly 
account for increases in costs rather than solely R&D. DiMasi et al. (2003) find that 
clinical trial expenditures account for 70% of the total out-of-pocket expenditures. 
Similarly, Boldrin & Levine (2008) found that clinical trials accounted for 80% or more 
of the total cost of developing a new drug. For example, the pharmaceutical company 
Pfizer recorded $800 million of expenses on clinical trials in 2006 (Boldrin & Levine, 
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2008). Based on the DiMasi et al. (2003) estimate, this would mean that the clinical trial 
expenses account for almost all of R&D expenses. 
Grabowski (2002) estimates the annual rate of increase in costs since the 1980s to 
be 7.4% more above general inflation than prior to the 1980s. After analyzing at the costs 
of bringing a drug to the market since the Kefauver-Harris Bill was passed in 1962, it is 
clear that monetary costs have increased as the FDA approval process has become 
significantly more complex.  
 
 
PHARMACEUTICAL RISKS 
In addition to the out-of-pocket costs, there is scientific, economic, and legislative 
risk in developing drugs. This is because of the uncertainty in whether the project will be 
scientifically successful, economically viable, and will obtain FDA approval. Grabowski 
(2002) estimates that less than 1 % of the drugs entering the preclinical period will make 
it to testing and only 20% of products brought to the clinical trials will survive the 
process and gain FDA marketing approval.  
In addition, there is uncertainty in the length of time that the development and 
FDA approval process will take which results in large opportunity costs for NDAs. 
Goozner (2004) finds that the actual time it takes to discover a drug can range from 
anywhere between 3 months to 30 years. DiMasi et al. (2003) estimate that the total R&D 
process takes 12 years from the initial drug discovery to bringing a new drug to market. 
A study published three years later by Adams and Brantner (2006), estimates that it takes 
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12-15 years from the start of research to successfully marketing a drug after the FDA 
approves it, but that the actual FDA approval process lasts approximately 1.8 years.  
 
 
ORPHAN DRUG R&D COSTS 
The orphan drug market has similar economic characteristics to the larger 
pharmaceutical industry however production incentives are even lower. Like the larger 
pharmaceutical industry, orphan products carry large sunk costs to scientifically develop 
and legislative costs in the approval process. The estimations of R&D costs for orphan 
drugs are similar to the data available for the overall pharmaceutical market in that they 
are limited in scope and vary depending upon the source The limited research shows that 
the development costs for each orphan product tends to vary depending on the therapeutic 
classification assigned by the FDA, similar to the overall pharmaceutical industry. This 
suggests that the costs of developing orphan drugs are about the same as the development 
costs of other drugs.  
A study by the U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) (1993), 
estimates the R&D costs over the same period as the study produced by DiMasi et al. 
(1991). After finding that the study by DiMasi et al. (1991) did not consider the value that 
the Orphan drug tax credit would provide, the OTA (1993) decided to consider this value 
in their analysis. The study found that had DiMasi et al. (1991) included the orphan drug 
tax credit, they would have shown R&D costs for successful NCE to be no more than 
$80.1 million, or $237 million in 1993 dollars (OTA, 1993). 
18 
 
While the average costs of orphan products may be similar to the pharmaceutical 
industry as a whole, the population sizes of the two markets are very different. A report7 
by EvaluatePharma 8 entitled “2014 Orphan Drug Report” found that the median cost per 
patient is 19 times higher for orphan drugs than non-orphan drugs (EvaluatePharma, 
2014). Therefore, even though the average costs are similar, the cost per patient is much 
larger in the orphan drug market due to the smaller patient populations. 
Interestingly, studies estimate that clinical trials, which are the most expensive 
part of the drug development process, cost much less for orphan drugs. A study by Love 
& Palmedo (2001) from the Consumer Project on Technology (CPT), estimates that the 
average cost of clinical trials for orphan drugs in the US was only $7.9 million prior to 
the tax credit and only $3.9 million after applying the tax credit in 1997 and 1998.9 This 
amount is significantly lower than the clinical trial expenses reported earlier (DiMasi et 
al., 2001; Boldrin & Levine, 2008). In comparison, the EvaluatePharma (2014) report 
estimates that the costs of clinical trials during Phase III of orphan drug development cost 
half the amount of non-orphan drugs before applying the tax credit, which is reduced to 
potentially a quarter of the costs after applying the tax credit (EvaluatePharma, 2014). 
Lastly, the time costs for orphan drugs are much smaller. EvaluatePharma (2014) 
estimates that orphan drug FDA approval time takes only 10 months compared to 13 
months for non-orphan drugs (EvaluatePharma, 2014). This is with the exception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The “2014 Orphan Drug Report”, produced by EvaluatePharma, provides an overview 
of the expected performance of the orphan drug market until 2020. The report is based on 
the forecasts by 500 leading pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. 
8 EvaluatePharma is a firm that provides intelligence in biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical markets. 
9 Estimates are based on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax returns and US FDA 
marketing approvals for the two-year period 1997-1998. 
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phase III clinical trials, which the report finds are no quicker than for non-orphan drugs 
(EvaluatePharma, 2014). Because the FDA approves orphan products more quickly, the 
time costs associated with the approval process are much lower than for the larger 
industry.  
 
 
ORPHAN DRUG RISKS 
Orphan drug development risks have decreased substantially since the ODA was 
passed in 1983. Historically, there has been the perception that orphan drug production is 
scientifically risky because it lacks funding and expertise. There very well could be 
scientific uncertainty in the early research stages because there may be less knowledge 
and research available of how to treat the disease than for more prevalent diseases or 
“me-too” drugs. However given the recent attention by public policy and progress of 
research grants, universities, and other non-profits, scientific risk is no longer a 
substantial deterrent for orphan drug manufacturers.  
Additionally, the perception that the orphan drug market lacks funding seems to 
have changed over the recent years. Expectations in the orphan drug market are highly 
optimistic, according to the EvaluatePharma “2014 Orphan Drug Report.” The report 
estimates that the orphan drug market will grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(CAGR) of 10.5% per year between 2014 and 2020 and reach $176 billion by 2020, 
accounting for 19.1% of worldwide prescription sales (EvaluatePharma, 2014).10 This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These sales up to 2013 were based on the Top 500 pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies reported sales data. The forecasts to 2020 were based on a consensus of 
leading equity analysts’ estimates for company product sales and segmental sales. 
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double the prediction for the prescription drug market, which EvaluatePharma estimates 
to grow only 5.3% CAGR (EvaluatePharma, 2014). The report also estimates that the 
sales of drugs designated as orphans by the US, Europe, or Japan, will grow at an annual 
rate of nearly 11% per year through 2020 compared with only about 4% for drugs 
treating larger populations (EvaluatePharma, 2014). Due to optimism surrounding orphan 
drug performance, there is less economic risk for orphan products than for other 
pharmaceuticals. 
One reason for this optimism is that the approval rate for orphan drugs is much 
higher than for other drugs. From 1983 until 2013 the FDA has consistently granted 
roughly 70% of the orphan drug designation requests (PHRMA, 2013). The FDA 
approval rate for all drugs from 2003-2011 was only 10% (CDER, 2013). Therefore, the 
risk of FDA approval associated with pharmaceuticals is much lower for orphan 
products. 
These findings are limited, however, because most of the data used by 
EvaluatePharma (2014) are collected from pharmaceutical companies. Therefore the data 
are subject to self-reporting bias. Furthermore, because EvaluatePharma produces the 
report with the intent of “providing senior decision makers within the pharmaceutical 
industry with an essential service that models the sector from the viewpoint of the 
world’s financial markets,” information may be framed to present their clients favorably 
(EvaluatePharma, 2014). Another limitation is that the report is not all-inclusive of 
orphan products. The report defines a clean subset of “orphan” products using a number 
of criteria, including products that companies expect will generate more than 25% of their 
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sales from their orphan indications (EvaluatePharma, 2014). 11  Therefore drugs with 
orphan indications that contribute 25% or less of their total sales are not included in the 
analysis.  
While uncertainty appears to be lower in the orphan drug market than in the 
pharmaceutical industry on average, there is other added regulatory uncertainty in the 
orphan drug market. First, there is the uncertainty of whether a sponsor will be granted 
exclusivity, which can drastically alter the drug’s success. Additionally, there is the 
uncertainty whether orphan drug legislation will change in the future.  Because orphan 
drugs have recently become a focus of public policy, it is possible that there will be 
revisions to the ODA that could revise the language of the legislation and make it more 
difficult to obtain orphan designation approval. However unless there is a significant 
amendment to the ODA that alters the incentives produced by the Act, small alterations 
will most likely not have any major effect on orphan development in the near future. 
 
 
PHARMACEUTICAL RETURNS 
The available data showing returns to pharmaceutical investments vary widely 
with each new drug produced. This is due a variety of variables including the patient 
population, future prevalence of the disease, reimbursement policies, generic 
competition, and effective marketing and advertising tactics. These factors cause a wide 
variance in the returns for a drug product. For example, some drugs may become 
blockbusters as scientists discover other uses for a drug, while others generate much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See EvaluatePharma Group’s complete definition of “clean subset of orphan products” 
[http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/evaluatepharmaltd/images/2014OD.pdf]. 
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lower sales. Alternatively, some products may begin as successful blockbusters, yet once 
generic competition enters their market, their returns may diminish over time. 
In order to invest in a drug product with a high sunk cost, the returns must be 
sufficient to cover those large costs. Because NME’s require more R&D than a “me-too 
drug,” they carry a large sunk cost. Therefore their expected returns must be greater in 
order for pharmaceutical companies to develop the product. In his paper, Kremer (2000) 
cites the estimate produced by Whitehead (1999), a consultant of the global consulting 
firm Mercer Management Consulting, who concludes that there must be at least $250 
million in expected returns annually in order to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to 
invest in NME. Essentially, the returns must compensate for the R&D cost, time cost, 
opportunity cost, and risk, and generate a profit for the drug manufacturer. Therefore, 
drug manufacturers will not pursue many of the R&D opportunities in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
 
ORPHAN DRUG RETURNS 
Based on the findings discussed in the previous section, orphan drugs seem to cost 
less than other drugs. This suggests that lower investment in orphan drugs is due to other 
aspects of the orphan drug market. While scientific and legislative risk during the R&D 
and FDA approval processes is prevalent in the larger pharmaceutical industry, orphan 
drug producers face greater economic uncertainty. This is because compared to the larger 
pharmaceutical industry, markets for orphan drugs are inherently small and often 
unknown, and therefore the expected returns are lower. 
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A report by Bienz-Tadmor et al. (1992) highlights the variance in returns in the 
orphan drug market, finding that 75% of orphan drugs earned less than $10 million 
during their first year under market exclusivity, 20% had sales greater than $26 million, 
and two products had sales greater than $100 million. This distribution of orphan drug 
sales is highly skewed, similar to the distribution of revenues for other pharmaceutical 
products, though comparatively the sales are smaller (Bienz-Tadmor et al., 1992). These 
findings suggest that the orphan drug market differs from the overall pharmaceutical 
industry not by the variance of returns, but by whether the returns will be large enough to 
cover the costs.  
Grabowski (2005) finds that orphan drugs are similar to NME investments, whose 
expected returns are too small to cover the large sunk cost of their R&D. This suggests 
that while the anticipated costs of orphan products may be smaller, the expected returns 
are much lower, so it is unclear whether firms will have a return on investment (ROI) that 
covers the investment costs. However, EvaluatePharma (2014) finds that the expected 
ROI of phase III orphan drugs or orphan designations filed with the FDA is 1.89 times 
greater than for non-orphan drugs.12 Therefore, uncertainty in the ROI may only be 
higher for orphan products during the early research stages, but is actually lower during 
the approval and development process. This suggests that pharmaceutical companies are 
discouraged from developing drugs for small or unknown patient populations during the 
early research stages. 
While prior to 1983 there were very few orphan drugs available, it is clear that 
research in developing rare diseases has increased since then. Wellman-Labadie and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Note: as mentioned on p. 26, the sample of orphan products used in the estimate is not 
all-inclusive.  
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Zhou (2010) found that on average, the FDA approved orphan designations of 47 new 
products per year from 1983-1989, increasing to 65 new products per year from 1990-
1999, and increasing once to 109 products per year from 2000-2008. The increase in 
orphan drug development could be due to several reasons. First, clinical trials for orphan 
products are easier to conduct. With the tax credit, clinical trials for orphan drugs cost 
less than trials of other drugs and the size of the clinical trials is automatically smaller. 
Additionally, under the exclusivity period orphan drugs can be sold at higher prices once 
they are approved for marketing because there are fewer alternative treatments for orphan 
drugs than for other products. This allows drug manufacturers to maintain clear pricing 
power, which EvaluatePharma (2014) estimates is an average cost per patient that is six 
times that of non-orphan drugs. Lastly, orphan drug producers have an advantage because 
the FDA tends to expedite approval for orphan products with few alternative treatments, 
allowing these products to reach the market faster.  
 
 
 
 
“PUSH” VS. “PULL” INCENTIVES IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
 
The development of the pharmaceutical industry during the 20th century led to the 
creation of policies under the ODA that helped alleviate some of the high fixed costs and 
variable returns in orphan drug development. Legislation has attempted to stimulate 
investment in drug development by creating “push” incentives and “pull” incentives. 
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These incentives have helped reduce costs on the supply side and also stimulate the 
returns on the demand side. Both types of incentives aim to increase R&D in orphan 
products, although they differ in their approach. After a drug sponsor submits their 
application for orphan designation to the FDA Office of Orphan Products Development 
(OOPD), the OOPD administers these incentives established under the ODA, reviews the 
applications, ensures that the sponsor maintains the regulator requirements, and 
facilitates the orphan grant program (Angeles Villarreal, 2001). This section examines 
the incentives created within the ODA.  
 
 
“PUSH” INCENTIVES 
Push incentives work by rewarding the research inputs, namely the R&D 
spending, by drug manufacturers (Mueller-Langer, 2013). In orphan drug production 
these incentives appear in the form of R&D grants, publicly financed research 
institutions, tax credits, FDA fee waivers, and other protocol assistance. These 
mechanisms have generally proven to be effective in stimulating orphan drug 
development; however it is unclear whether their approach is optimal for orphan drug 
production.  
R&D grants are provided to drug manufacturers by the government, non-profits, 
and private organizations for orphan drug development. The ODA, for example, 
established a research grants program administered by the OOPD under the supervision 
of the FDA. Under this program, researchers compete for grants to defray the costs of 
conducting clinical trials that support orphan drug approval or studies on the safety and 
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efficacy of designated orphan drugs (Angeles Villarreal, 2001). The program focuses on 
early clinical development in phase I and II and involves grants of between $150,000 and 
$300,000 (Grabowski, 2005). This accelerates the development process and allows 
sponsors to enter the early stages of development with lower costs. 
One fallback of grant programs is that they often only cover clinical development 
trials and are not extended to cover basic research of diseases (Grabowski, 2005). 
Extending the grants to be used for basic research on diseases would allow more 
participation of research universities and smaller biopharmaceutical firms, which have 
orphan drug expertise (Grabowski, 2005).  
Similar to R&D grants, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) offer support for R&D 
projects at many stages during the development process. PPPs tend to be non-profit 
organizations, such as the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), which help 
develop new vaccines and medicines treating rare diseases. One setback of PPPs is that 
they are usually narrowly focused on specific diseases and have specified research areas 
towards which they provide support (Grabowski, 2005). 
Publicly financed research institutions use public funding to produce research. 
These institutions transfer the cost of producing basic research from the private sector to 
the public sector. This is an attempt to fix the problem of low private sector investment in 
basic research pertaining to rare diseases because that research is usually neither 
patentable nor profitable (Mueller-Langer, 2013). Having access to public funds from 
sources such as universities or the NIH allows drug manufacturers to build off of research 
and pursue projects that would not be pursued under private sector incentives alone. Like 
R&D grants, these institutions reduce, or eliminate completely, the sunk costs of orphan 
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drug R&D for the private sector, laying the costs on the public sector. This allows private 
manufacturers to use the research to pursue subsequent research that is patentable and 
profitable, making investment in drugs with lower returns is more appealing. 
There are problems with using government funding directly. Adverse selection of 
research projects could occur, because the researcher has the autonomy to decide which 
research efforts to pursue with the funds. For instance, publicly funded researchers could 
choose to focus on projects of interest to them, such as publishing an academic paper, or 
preparing a grant application, rather than developing a scientifically valuable product 
(Glennerster & Kremer, 2004). Furthermore, a situation of moral hazard could arise if 
special interest groups and lobbyists divert their research efforts away from projects that 
would be scientifically valuable (Glennerster & Kremer, 2004). In theory, publicly 
funded researchers would have the autonomy to decide which scientifically valuable 
research efforts to pursue, however in reality, the influence of a third party holding 
bargaining power can alter the researcher allocates the funds. Pursuing projects with 
public funds for objectives other than for scientifically valuable projects would reduce 
societal welfare and produce a dead weight loss (Mueller-Langer, 2013).  
Additionally, there is asymmetric information between researchers and research 
administrators, because the funder, rather than the market, decides where to allocate 
R&D efforts (Mueller-Langer, 2013). This is could lead to projects that are not 
economically viable, because government-funded researchers are not working for profit 
like private sector researchers are. Therefore, the projects pursued are largely dependent 
upon the funder, rather than the market, and may not be the most efficient. Glennerster & 
Kremer (2004) note the empirical evidence suggesting that the rate of return on publicly 
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financed R&D is much lower than that of privately financed R&D. Ultimately there is a 
tradeoff between alleviating some of the private sector costs of investing in orphan drugs, 
and the efficiency of orphan drug research. 
The orphan drug tax credit is another incentive established under the ODA in 
1983. The tax credit targets R&D costs at late stages in the drug development process. 
Drug manufacturers may claim tax credits of up to 50% for expenditures incurred during 
the clinical trials phase, the most expensive phase, for both approved and non-approved 
orphan products. At first, the credit only applied to taxable incomes during the year in 
which the company incurred the qualified expenses. This meant that only companies with 
taxable incomes during the same year as their clinical research expenditures benefitted. 
Because many orphan drug developers were small startup firms with no products on the 
market, little taxable income, and growing R&D expenses, the marginal value of the 
credit was small. In 1997 when the tax credit became permanent, it allowed 
manufacturers to carry unused credits forward 20 years and back one year. The tax credit 
became more useful because companies could put the credit towards income taxes of 
subsequent years when the credit will be useful. 
A study performed by the U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA, 1993), analyzes the value of the orphan drug tax credit for drug manufacturers. 
The study finds that the after-tax cost of an additional dollar of clinical research without 
the tax credit is $0.66, when the marginal tax rate is 34% (OTA, 1993).13 With the tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The OTA (1993) study finds that the after-tax cost of an additional dollar of research 
without the tax credit is: $1.00 - $0.34 = $0.66. The study assumes the marginal corporate 
tax rate is 34%. 
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credit, the cost of an additional dollar of clinical research is only $0.50 (OTA, 1993).14 
This is because expenses eligible for the orphan drug tax credit cannot be deducted from 
taxable income. Overall, the tax credit lowers the cost of the extra dollar of clinical 
orphan research by 24% less than what the cost would be without the tax credit (OTA, 
1993). Because the OTA performed this study before the 20-year carry forward and one-
year fall back provision, the marginal value of the tax credit is likely greater than 
suggested by this estimation. 
One fault of the tax credit is it does not help with overall R&D expenses for 
orphan drugs, only clinical testing expenses. Therefore the tax credit is most beneficial to 
drug manufacturers incurring large clinical testing expenses for an orphan product. The 
US General Accounting Office (GAO, 1989) estimates that across all industries, 
qualifying R&D represents only 70% of all R&D spending. Because not all expenses 
qualify for the tax credit, the actual cost of an additional dollar of clinical R&D would be 
greater than $0.50 (OTA, 1993). Even though the actual costs saved are not as high as 
50%, because clinical expenses are millions of dollars, the cost savings are still 
substantial. Consequently, tax savings are an important factor in the decision to begin or 
continue clinical testing of orphan drugs. 
Similar incentives include FDA fee waivers and protocol assistance. FDA fee 
waivers reduce the transactions costs associated with the FDA approval process for a new 
orphan drug. This waives the standard fees incurred by drug manufacturers and charged 
by the FDA when filing a NDA, for orphan drug manufacturers. Other forms of protocol 
assistance include guidance by the FDA and other organizations. Additionally, programs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The after tax cost of dollar of R&D is under the tax credit $1.00 - $0.50 = $0.50. 
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such as priority review and fast-track development status are designed to accelerate the 
drug development and approval process.  
Critics of push mechanisms argue that they are hard to monitor and invite moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems. Subsidizing research inputs for a specific 
pharmaceutical product rather than rewarding successful product development also 
invites monitoring problems (Angeles Villarreal, 2001). These issues suggest that push 
mechanisms are less effective and sub-optimal for the development of orphan products, 
because they do not put funds to their optimal use. Critics believe that other incentives 
targeting the returns to drug development would be more effective. 
 
 
“PULL” INCENTIVES 
Pull incentives target the supply side of the pharmaceutical industry by reducing 
the risk and increasing the returns to pharmaceutical product development (Mueller-
Langer, 2013). The two particular “pull” mechanisms that are essential to the 
pharmaceutical industry are patents and market exclusivity periods. Orphan drugs can 
obtain a patent and once the drug is approved as an orphan product, the FDA grants drug 
manufacturers seven years of market exclusivity rights. These mechanisms are labeled as 
“pull incentives” because they attract pharmaceutical companies to the market by 
stimulating the returns to investment. Unlike push incentives that reduce the costs of drug 
development, pull incentives attempt to link the returns to orphan drug investment with 
the health impact of effective orphan products. Pull incentives in orphan drug 
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development must be large enough so that they compensate for the insufficient market 
revenues. 
 
 
1. PATENTS 
Patents are the exclusive and legal right over an underlying patented technology, 
idea, or process deemed to have novelty and utility, for a limited period of time, in 
exchange for the full disclosure of the information necessary to the production of the 
invention (USPTO, 2015).15 This guarantees the patent holder the revenue generated 
from their invention until the patent expires. In the pharmaceutical industry, patents 
protect the underlying process or chemical make-up of a drug for 20 years. There are 
contrasting studies on the effectiveness of patents in the pharmaceutical industry and in 
the orphan drug market in particular. Some support their use and others question their 
actual impact. This section will review some of the literature pertaining to patent 
application in the pharmaceutical industry and the orphan drug market. 
Patent proponents in the pharmaceutical industry see that the returns are 
insufficient to justify the large costs, and patent systems encourage drug investment. 
Bessen & Meurer (2009) agree, arguing that patents may not be optimal for other 
industries, but are essential in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries because of the 
hefty initial investment. Grabowski & Vernon (1990) found that in countries with 
successful pharmaceutical industries, patent protection was strong. British economists 
Silberston & Taylor (1973) conducted a survey among R&D managers in the UK and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See USPTO http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-
concerning-patents 
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based on their findings, they estimated that pharmaceutical expenditures on R&D would 
be reduced by 64% in absence of patent protections. In contrast, they found that the 
reduction would only be 8% across all other industries (Taylor & Silbertson, 1973).  
These arguments rest on the knowledge that drug development differs from other 
patented technology because of the huge cost of R&D highlighted in the previous section, 
and that without patent protection the industry would not survive. Additionally, 
supporters of patents argue that they produce information about a drug’s effect on 
individuals, making the costs of distributing or absorbing this information low while 
acquiring it very high, and providing a public good.  
Critics of patents in the pharmaceutical industry see them as unnecessary, 
producing negative externalities, or as in the case of orphan drugs, as ineffective or 
insufficient. Baker & Chatani (2002) argue that the large cost of R&D is largely due to 
the waste created by patents. They explain that patents lead research towards “copycat” 
drugs rather than effective patent research. Specifically, they find the amount of 
“wasteful” research was between $4.9billion and $17.6 billion and “effective patent 
supported” research was between $5.5 billion and $18.2 billion, in the year 2000 (Baker 
& Chatani, 2002). They explain how patents spark litigation costs and resources being 
put towards being the first to file for a patent, the costs of defending it, and the costs of 
persuading doctors to prescribe their particular drug instead of another generic or cheaper 
alternative (Baker & Chatani, 2002).  
As discussed earlier, the majority of costs originate in the clinical trials phase of 
the drug approval process. Boldrin & Levine (2008) argue that the clinical trials for 
imitative drugs are not “socially valuable,” meaning that they do not lead to innovative or 
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therapeutically beneficial drugs, so there is no reason for the sponsors of those drugs to 
be compensated for those costs. They do believe, however, that the clinical trials for 
innovative or therapeutically beneficial drugs are socially valuable, but believe that it is 
unnecessary to recoup their costs through patents (Boldrin & Levine, 2008). They 
propose that clinical trial costs for therapeutically beneficial drugs be paid for publicly 
through grants, rather than privately (Boldrin & Levine, 2008).  
Granstrand & Holgersson (2013) discuss what they call the intellectual 
disassembly problem, which occurs in a patent system. The intellectual disassembly 
problem means that there is a problem of allocating intellectual property rights or 
separating or disintegrating patents to different pharmaceutical companies for particular 
chemical compounds that might be made up of others that are already patented. 
Companies cannot easily exchange these patents to acquire ones they would need to 
develop a new drug, because patents cannot easily be separated in that manner. 
Therefore, this makes transactions impossible between companies or increases 
transactions costs more generally, and might hurt product markets. 
Orphan drugs, in particular, tend to be difficult to patent, because many orphan 
drugs are biotech drugs that are either already patented or not patentable. A study by 
Bienz-Tadmor et al. (1992) finds that many potential orphan products are issued patents, 
but the patents tend to expire before the product is able to reach the market, making them 
ineffective in the orphan market. In 1985 the ODA extended market exclusivity to both 
patentable and un-patentable products, because of these very reasons. Market exclusivity 
has become a solution to the need for protection extensions in the orphan drug market. 
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The purpose of the additional incentives under market exclusivity is to extend the 
protection under patents for orphan products. 
 
 
2. MARKET EXCLUSIVITY 
Beginning on the date that the FDA approves a NDA as an ODE, the drug 
manufacturer has access to exclusive marketing rights for seven years. The exclusivity 
rights apply only to the indication for which the FDA has designated the drug (Angeles 
Villarreal, 2001). As a result, competitors are excluded from the same market even if 
theirs is an entirely different drug with a different chemical makeup or process. While 
during this period of exclusivity it is possible for the FDA to approve an additional 
application for the same drug for a different indication, the FDA cannot approve a 
generic or drug containing the same active ingredient from another manufacturer for the 
same indication if a firm is already holding protection for. An exception arises if the 
manufacturer has the consent of the original sponsor, or if the sponsor cannot provide a 
sufficient quantity of the drug (Angeles Villarreal, 2001). Furthermore, the FDA can 
accept and approve a subsequent orphan drug application for the same drug or indication 
if the applicant demonstrates that the product is “clinically superior” to the first drug. 
Similar to patents, rather than lowering the costs of producing new drugs, market 
exclusivity rights grant the drug manufacturer monopoly rights in order to increase 
returns. Exclusivity rights are different from patents because they are a monopoly over 
the marketing of a drug for a particular treatment and protect against competition from a 
drug having a similar effect, rather than over the chemical structure or production of the 
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drug itself. While patents serve as both incentive to disclose and incentive to invest, 
market exclusivity periods provide only incentive to invest. Patents increase social 
welfare by requiring the patent holder to disclose the information required to produce the 
invention and granting the manufacturer an intellectual monopoly for a limited period of 
time, yet market exclusivity periods do not have this same social welfare effect. Market 
exclusivity periods solely strengthen the intellectual monopoly and do not add to the 
dissemination of information. 
These seven years of exclusivity could be seen as more generous than a patent, 
because they allow the drug manufacturer to have a monopoly over the entire market for 
that treatment. This increases the returns for that sole manufacturer by barring firms from 
marketing a drug treating the same disease as one that has already been granted 
exclusivity. Market exclusivity periods can also provide an extension on the protection 
under patents, or an alternative in particular instances when orphan drugs cannot obtain a 
patent. The exclusive right to market the ODE can run alongside a patent as an additional 
incentive or separately, as long as the provision requirements are met. According to the 
FDA, the market exclusivity period is the most important and effective regulatory scheme 
under the ODA, and is the “most sought incentive” by pharmaceutical companies (FDA, 
2014).  
Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2009) discuss the benefits of the market exclusivity 
period in their paper. They explain how market size affects drug development, 
consumption, and other welfare factors. When production entails fixed or sunk costs, the 
number of products that will be developed can increase with the size of the market 
(Litchenberg & Waldfogel, 2009). Access to a larger potential market provides greater 
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rewards for firms bringing a new product to the market, and these additional products 
increase welfare. These “preference externalities” arise with drugs targeting large 
markets (Litchenberg & Waldfogel, 2009). Through this process, consumers benefit each 
other, as preference externalities arise, and this places downward pressure on prices. 
Drugs targeting small markets do not have access to these preference externalities. 
However, under the provisions of the ODA, the effective market size for orphan products 
increased and the fixed costs were reduced. This is because the ODA weakens the link 
between market size and the welfare of a small consumer group (Litchenberg & 
Waldfogel, 2009). Under the ODA there is the access to a larger market and greater 
rewards for firms, who in turn produce additional products, which increases social 
welfare as consumers have more options and are better able to suit their needs. Their 
empirical evidence finds that there were declines in mortality among individuals with rare 
diseases, compared to other diseases, because of the incentives created under the act and 
development of treatments for rare diseases (Litchenberg & Waldfogel, 2009). 
Most of the empirical research surrounding the provisions of the ODA is highly 
supportive, however often produced by pharmaceutical interests. The scholarly research 
critiquing the ODA and its provisions has mainly a theoretical emphasis, with little 
empirical analysis. The following sections will take an alternative approach to looking at 
the effects of the ODA and its provisions on orphan drug development, through case 
studies and a difference in differences model of orphan drug revenues.  
 
 
 
37 
 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
Since the implementation of the ODA in 1983, there has been a significant 
increase in the number of ODE produced. Before the ODA, the FDA had approved only 
58 orphan designations, and fewer than ten in the decade before the Act came into effect 
(PhRMA, 2013). Over the 31 years since the implementation of the ODA in 1983 until 
2014 there have been 3,273 orphan drug designations, 487 of which the FDA approved 
for marketing, 5 of which were withdrawn from the market (OOPD, 2015).16 This yields 
an approval rate for orphan products of roughly 15%. While it is evident that under the 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA) the number of orphan products approved by the FDA and the 
returns to orphan drug development have increased, in analyzing orphan product sales it 
is also apparent that some orphan products vastly outperform others.  
 
 
A. CASE STUDIES 
This study traces the development paths of several orphan drugs, chosen by their 
specific characteristics. This includes analyzing the designations and corresponding 
indications of each drug after the market exclusivity provision and ODA incentives come 
into effect. In addition, this section will compare the revenues of orphan products over 
time using the difference-in-differences (DD) method. The revenues used in this analysis 
were collected through primary source materials, industry reports, drug manufacturers’ 
annual reports, and filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For orphan drug Indication-level data on designations, approvals, and withdrawals see 
online FDA Orphan Drug Product Designation Database published by OOPD from 1983-
2014 [http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/]. 
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the EDGAR database. The values are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) for that year. The purpose is to isolate which orphan products, characterized 
by their chemical and approved indication type, have outperformed others since the ODA 
incentive system began and market exclusivity periods came into effect. This can suggest 
which orphan products may benefit more from the current legislation. 
By definition, orphan drugs treat a population of 200,000 individuals or less, yet, 
by closely analyzing the FDA Approved Orphan Product Designation Database from the 
Office of Orphan Products Development (OOPD) from 1983 until 2014, it is clear that 
they differ in terms of their chemical type, approved indications, and revenues. This 
analysis focuses on orphan drug chemical types that are NMEs and those approved under 
the new active ingredient or new dosage form (FDA).17 This study uses two terms to 
categorize orphans by their approved indications: “only orphan” products and “partial 
orphan” products. “Only orphan” products are orphan drugs that are only approved for 
one or more orphan indication. “Partial Orphan” products are orphan drugs that are 
approved for both orphan and non-orphan indications. This analysis distinguishes the size 
of the returns by labeling drugs as orphan blockbusters, generating over $1 billion in 
revenue annually, or non-blockbuster orphans.  
Each year, many of the NMEs approved by the FDA are for orphan indications. 
For example, in 2012 of the 39 NME drugs approved by the FDA, most treated rare 
diseases and were granted orphan drug status. Similarly, in 2013 the FDA approved 27 
NMEs, nine (or 30%) of which were orphan drugs. While a significant portion of NMEs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a full listing of NDA chemical types and their meanings see 
[http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm075234.htm#chemtype_reviewclass
]. 
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approved are for orphan indications, since the ODA was passed in 1983, many orphan 
drug approvals have been for indications for existing drugs, rather than for NMEs. From 
1983-2002, 54%, of annual orphan drug approvals were for indications other than NMEs 
or new biopharmaceuticals. This percentage appears to be growing larger, because while 
the FDA has approved more orphan drugs, the number of new orphan designations and 
NMEs per year has remained relatively stable. 
It appears that the actual number of new drugs brought to the market is much 
lower than the 487 marketing approvals cited by the FDA. Organizing the approved 
designations by drug name shows that approximately 222 of the 487 approved 
designations (roughly 46%) consists of drugs with multiple orphan indications, meaning 
drugs with marketing exclusivity for more than one treatment. These 222 approved 
designations actually represent 80 separate drugs, having as few as 2 or as many as 16 
indications per drug. Moreover, these are solely the orphan indications, as the database 
does not include the non-orphan FDA approved indications held by many of these drugs. 
Therefore, the number of drugs having solely orphan indications is probably much lower.  
It is possible for drugs to obtain multiple orphan and/or non-orphan indications, 
because the requirements for approval under the ODA allow drug manufacturers to 
categorize indications for particular treatments by populations of 200,000 people or 
fewer. Therefore, it is unnecessary to focus on a drug’s R&D costs and estimated returns 
if the population is smaller than 200,000 individuals. A drug can be approved for 
indications treating populations larger than 200,000 individuals and still qualify for 
orphan market exclusivity protections, if these applications of the drug are for small 
enough treatment populations and receive separate designations. For these reasons, the 
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treatment population size is the main focus. Drug manufacturers break down populations 
into small, narrowly defined treatment groups and add additional designations for 
additional indications of a drug, in order to reap larger returns, a tactic called “salami 
slicing.” It is common for drug manufacturers to acquire designations for orphan 
indications in addition to non-orphan indications (partial orphans), or for other orphan 
indications (only orphans). The case studies below describe the production paths of seven 
orphan only products in further detail, some of which demonstrate the “salami slicing” 
technique in blockbuster drugs. 
 
 
i. BOTOX® 
 In 1895 a Belgian professor, Emile van Ermengen, discovered Botulinum toxin, 
but it was not until the 1920s that scientists located Botulinum Toxin Type A, which later 
became known by the name BOTOX® (Allergan, Inc., 2010b). In 1946 scientists turned 
the molecule into a solid substance, which allowed them to discover its therapeutic uses 
(Allergan, Inc. 2010b). In the 1950s researchers found that muscles injected with the 
toxin would become relaxed. This finding sparked an interest in the drug and suggested 
that there could be other potentially therapeutic uses. In the 1960s scientists discovered 
that the drug could treat strabismus, a crossed eye condition known as “lazy eye”, and the 
company Oculinum, Inc. began testing the drug (Allergan, Inc. 2010b). In 1988, Allergan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the current sponsor of the drug, acquired the company and drug for 
$9 million (Allergan, Inc. 2010b). On December 29, 1989 Botulinum Toxin Type A was 
one of the first orphan products approved to treat crossed eyes in addition to 
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blepharospasm, a condition of uncontrollable blinking. The ODA allowed Allergan, Inc. 
to hold seven years of exclusive marketing rights for the drug under the trade name 
BOTOX®. 
 
Table 1: Approved Indications for BOTOX® 18 
# Indication for Treatment Designation Approval 
Orphan 
Exclusivity Start 
Orphan 
Exclusivity End 
1 Crossed-Eyes and 
Uncontrollable Blinking 
03/22/1984 12/29/1989 12/29/1996 
2 
Abnormal Head Position and 
Neck Pain from Cervical 
Dystonia (Muscle Spasms) 
08/20/1986 12/21/2000 12/21/2007 
3 Glabellar Lines (Frown Lines) 2002 N/A N/A 
4 Hyperhidrosis (Excessive 
Sweating) 
2004 N/A N/A 
5 Chronic Migraines 2010 N/A N/A 
6 Canthal Lines (Crows Feet) 2013 N/A N/A 
 
Table 1 shows the indications approved for BOTOX® since 1989, with the most 
recent approval in 2013. As seen in Table 1, the FDA has approved BOTOX® for six 
indications, two of which are orphan indications. In total the drug treats eight different 
medical conditions in the US and has four therapeutic designations. Because BOTOX® 
has four non-orphan indications in addition to two orphan indications, the drug is a partial 
orphan.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Information regarding approved indications for BOTOX® were obtained from the 
Orphan Drug Product Designation Database and FDA Drug Approval Database. 
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Graph 1 traces BOTOX®’s path to becoming a blockbuster drug, generating 
annual revenues well over $1 billion. The graph depicts real revenues from 1991, two 
years after the drug was first approved for marketing, to the end of 2014. The growth rate 
of BOTOX® revenues from 1991-2014 is 10085%. This same period yields a CAGR of 
21%. There are several possible reasons for these high returns. First, BOTOX® has held 
two orphan market exclusivity periods on top of its patents. During its first period of 
exclusivity, from 1991-1996, its growth rate was 1403%. The second exclusivity period 
began in 2000, after which the graph becomes steeper. In Allergan’s Annual Report the 
company explains this growth by steadily increasing sales of pharmaceuticals treating 
medical conditions of the eye (Allergan, Inc., 2001).  
In 2002 the FDA approved the marketing of BOTOX® Cosmetic for the 
temporary improvement in the appearance of moderate to severe glabellar lines, 
otherwise known as frown lines, allowing the drug to enter a new market. Even though 
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BOTOX® had been used in off label cosmetic purposes, the approval allowed Allergan 
to advertise cosmetic use of BOTOX® directly to consumers. However, the company 
claims in their Annual report that 60% of the drug’s revenues in 2003 were the sales from 
therapeutic, rather than cosmetic uses. Allergan also adds that in 2003 the drug 
represented over one-third of their total sales, with sales increasing at over 25% per year. 
In 2004, the drug reached 34% of their total sales when the FDA approved the drug to 
treat excessive underarm sweating. The second exclusivity period ended in 2007, after 
which the revenues flatten out, also around the same time as the Great Recession. 
From 2010-2014 sales continue to rise at an even greater rate than before. During 
this time the FDA approved BOTOX® Cosmetic to help smooth the appearance of brow 
lines, known as crow’s feet, expanding the drug’s cosmetic reach (FDA News Release). 
Another possible reason for the massive profits is that the number of treatments has 
grown significantly; today there are over 5 million doses administered annually in North 
America, well over the original treatment population of 200,000 individuals or less 
(American Hospital Association, 2013). Additionally, the drug requires repeated annual 
visits that last only for about 4-6 months. Another consideration is the many different 
applications of the drug in over 73 countries (BOTOX® Cosmetic). 
 
 
ii. GLEEVEC® 
In 1959 scientists discovered what would become known as the “Philadelphia 
Chromosome,” in patients with Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia (CML), in a 
Philadelphia lab (NCI, 2014). CML is a deadly blood and bone marrow disease affecting 
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around 5,000 individuals in the US and 70,000 individuals worldwide, with a life 
expectancy of 4-6 years without treatment (NCI, 2014). In 1971 medical technologies 
were advancing and a new technique called "banding" allowed scientists to look more 
closely at the Philadelphia Chromosome, finding that it was the root the cause of the 
disease. In the 1980s, the scientific and academic communities partnered with Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corporation and together they discovered of the tyrinose kinase 
inhibitor, GLEEVEC®, or imatinib. The clinical trials phase for GLEEVEC® lasted only 
3 years and the FDA approved imatinib under the trade name GLEEVEC® within 3 
months, record timing for both processes. GLEEVEC® was first approved for marketing 
by the FDA in May 2001 to treat patients with advanced CML.  
Eventually scientists discovered how to use the drug to treat other cancers. The 
current orphan and non-orphan indications held by GLEEVEC® are depicted in Table 2 
below. As seen in Table 2 GLEEVEC® was approved for five additional indications in 
2006. Today, GLEEVEC® treats numerous medical conditions relating to pediatric 
cancer in the US and has seven approved orphan designations and four approved regular 
designations, making it a partial orphan. 
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Novartis claims in their annual report that in less than eight months on the market, 
GLEEVEC® was one of the drugs that substantially increased their sales performance by 
24% (Novartis, 2001). On May 10, 2008 the market exclusivity for the first indication 
expired, however, as indicated in the table above, the company had already obtained 
market exclusivity in 2002 for a second indication. By the time that exclusivity period 
expired in 2009 they had already obtained another two other market exclusivity periods. 
As of 2015, the last market exclusivity period for GLEEVEC® will expire in 2020.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Information regarding approved indications for GLEEVEC® were obtained from 
Orphan Drug Product Designation Database and FDA Drug Approval Database. 
Table 2: Approved Indications for GLEEVEC® 19 
# Indication for Treatment Designation Approval 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
Start 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
End 
1 
Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia (CML) 
(Cancer) 
01/31/2001 05/10/2001 05/10/2008 
2 
Advanced KIT-Positive Gastrointestinal 
Stromal Tumors (GIST) (Digestive Tumor) 
11/01/2001 02/01/2002 02/01/2009 
3 
Hypereosinophilic Syndrome (Organ 
Damage/Disease); Chronic Eosinophilic 
Leukemia (Cancer) 
08/25/2005 10/19/2006 10/19/2013 
4 Mastocytosis (Cancerous Cell Disease) 09/09/2005 10/19/2006 10/19/2013 
5 
Myelodysplastic/Myeloproliferative 
Diseases (Bone Marrow Failure) 
10/05/2005 10/19/2006 10/19/2013 
6 
Philadelphia Acute Lymphoblastic 
Leukemia (Ph+ALL) (Cancer) 10/11/2005 10/19/2006 10/19/2013 
7 
Dermatofibrosarcoma Protuberans (Rare 
Cancer) 12/19/2005 10/19/2006 10/19/2013 
8 Metastatic (Spreading) GIST 12/19/2008 N/A N/A 
9 Children with Ph+CML 2011 N/A N/A 
10 Adults, KIT-positive GIST removed 01/31/2012 N/A N/A 
11 Children with Ph+ALL 01/25/2013 N/A N/A 
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The graph above shows how successful the drug has been, peaking at over 
$5billion annually. The CAGR for GLEEVEC® is 20.6% from 2001-2014. During the 
peak years for the drug when it was under 7 exclusivity protections from 2006-2008, the 
growth rate was 34.6%. Sales declined after 2011, as the exclusivity periods began to 
expire. The overall growth rate for GLEEVEC® from 2001-2014 is 1281.5%. 
It is possible that the declines in sales beginning around 2011 are due to generic 
entry in the market. Sun Pharmaceutical, Inc.’s announced their plans to launch a generic 
version of imitinib in the US in 2016 after GLEEVECs patent is set to expire in 2015, and 
several generic versions of the drug already exist in Europe. Additionally, in 2013 the 
patent for GLEEVEC® expired in Europe where the drug has the trade name GILVEC®. 
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iii. TAXOL® 
 By 1955, only 6 cancer drugs were approved for clinical use in the US (Goodman 
& Walsh, 2001). In 1962 a compound that would become paclitaxel was first discovered 
through a plant-screening program run by the NCI and the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) (Goodman & Walsh, 2001). In the 1980s, paclitaxel, or what would 
be known as TAXOL®, was first developed by the NCI. The drug was registered in 1990 
to treat ovarian cancer with Bristol-Meyers Squibb as its sponsor. At the time of its 
approval TAXOL® was unpatented and licensed by the NCI. TAXOL® did not receive 
its first exclusivity for the treatment of ovarian cancer until 1992. 
 
Table 3 shows the indications approved for TAXOL® since 1990, with the most 
recent approval in 1999. As seen in Table 3, the FDA has approved TAXOL® for many 
subsequent indications for various cancers. TAXOL® has six indications, one of which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Information regarding approved indications for TAXOL® were obtained from Orphan 
Drug Product Designation Database and FDA Drug Approval Database. 
Table 3: Approved Indications for TAXOL® 20 
# Indication for Treatment Indication Approval 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
Start 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
End 
1 Ovarian Cancer 10/15/1990 N/A N/A 
2 Metastatic Breast Cancer 04/13/1994 N/A N/A 
3 AIDs related Kaposi’s sarcoma 03/25/1997 08/04/1997 08/04/2004 
4 
Carcinoma of the ovary in combination 
with cisplatin 
04/09/1998 N/A N/A 
5 Lung cancer 06/30/1998 N/A N/A 
6 Breast cancer in addition to chemotherapy 10/25/1999 N/A N/A 
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an orphan indication. In total, the drug treats four different medical conditions in the US 
and has four therapeutic designations. Because the drug holds five non-orphan indications 
in addition to one orphan indication, TAXOL® is a partial orphan product (Goodman & 
Walsh, 2001). 
 
 
 
The graph above shows the annual global sales for TAXOL® from 1992, the year 
it was granted non-orphan marketing exclusivity for 5 years, until 2008. Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb no longer reports TAXOL® sales individually in the company’s annual reports 
because the sales have dropped so low. In 2000 non-orphan exclusivity expired in the 
U.S. and generic companies began producing TAXOL®, which is likely the main cause 
of the continued erosion of the TAXOL® brand and decline in sales since 2000. 
Furthermore, the drug had exclusivity expire in 2003 in the E.U. The CAGR from 1992-
2004 when its first exclusivity expired is 23%. The actual growth rate over this period is 
1372%.  
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iv. FIRAZYR® 
In 2011, the FDA granted Shire Orphan Therapies seven years of market 
exclusivity for the orphan drug FIRAZYR®, otherwise known as icatibant. The drug was 
approved for the treatment of hereditary angioedema in adults, a condition that causes 
severe swelling in the face, throat, or abdomen. 
 
Table 4: Approved Indications for FIRAZYR® 21 
# Indication for Treatment  Designation Approval  
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
Start 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
End 
1 Acute attacks of hereditary 
angioedema 
11/25/2003 08/25/2011 08/25/2018 
 
Table 4 shows the indication approved for FIRAZYR® in 2011. As seen Table 4, 
FIRAZYR® has only been approved for one orphan indication, making it an only orphan 
product. The drug currently holds one patent set to expire on July 15, 2015. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Information regarding approved indications for FIRAZYR® were obtained from the 
Orphan Drug Product Designation Database and FDA Drug Approval Database. 
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The graph above depicts the annual global sales of the drug from 2008, through 
its approval in 2011, until 2014. Shire explains in their annual report that the growth after 
2011 was mostly due to sales in the US, new patients, and an increase in the level of 
repeat uses by patients (Shire annual report, 2012-13). The CAGR for FIRAZYR® over 
2008-2014 is 153%. The CAGR after the FDA approved the drug for marketing in 2010 
is 80%. The growth rate for the drug from 2008-2014 is 66145%, and from when the drug 
was approved for marketing it is 2922%. 
 
 
 
v. ELAPRASE® 
In 2006 Shire Orphan Therapies introduced ELAPRASE®, the trade name for 
idursulfase, to treat mucopolysaccharidosis II (Hunter syndrome). The drug worked by 
improving the walking capabilities of these patients. As seen in Table 5, ELAPRASE® 
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was approved for only one orphan indication in 2006, making it an only orphan product. 
The drug currently holds three patents, two of which will expire in 2015 with the final 
patent expiring in 2019. 
 
Table 5: Approved Indications for ELAPRASE® 22 
# Indication for Treatment Indication Approval 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
Start 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
End 
1 
Mucopolsaccharidosis II (Hunter 
syndrome) 
11/28/2001 07/24/2006 07/24/2013 
 
After Shire, Inc. launched ELAPRASE® in 2006, its sales grew rapidly. The 
graph below depicts the annual global revenues for ELAPRASE®. From 2012-2013 
revenues grew by 10%, which Shire explains was due to an increase in the number of 
patients on therapy. The CAGR over the life of the drug was 40.5%, with an overall 
growth rate of 2039%. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Information regarding approved indications for ELAPRASE® were obtained from the 
Orphan Drug Product Designation Database and FDA Drug Approval Database. 
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vi. VPRIV® 
VPRIV®, the trade name for velaglucerase-alfa for injection, was approved the 
FDA for marketing under priority review as an orphan drug in 2010, after being approved 
for designation in 2009 (FDA approved drug products database). The FDA granted its 
sponsor, Shire Human Genetic Therapies, Inc., marketing approval within six months to 
treat pediatric and adult patients with Type I Gaucher Disease, the most common 
autosomal recessive disease, caused by mutations in the glucocerebrosidase (GBA) gene. 
The disease causes harmful substances to build up in the liver, spleen, bone marrow, and 
other organs, preventing them from properly functioning (Shire, Inc.).  
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Table 6: Approved Indications for VPRIV® 23 
# Indication for Treatment  Indication Approval 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
Start 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
End 
1 Type I Gaucher Disease 06/08/2001 02/26/2010 02/26/2017 
 
According to the FDA approved drug database, VPRIV® is a NME chemical 
type. Table 6 shows the indication approved for VPRIV® in 2010. As seen in Table 6, 
VPRIV® has approval for only one orphan indication, making it an only orphan product.  
 
 
Graph 4 shows that VPRIV® sales have steadily increased since its approval for 
marketing in 2010. Shire’s annual reports state that the growth from 2010 to 2013, from 
$303.6 million to $342.7 million was 12%, and mostly driven by an increase in the 
number of individuals on therapy. The drug currently holds three patents in the US that 
will expire in 2017, 2022, and 2029. The CAGR for VPRIV® from 2009-2014 was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Information regarding approved indications for VPRIV® were obtained from the 
Orphan Drug Product Designation Database and FDA Drug Approval Database. 
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125.9%, which changed once the FDA approved the drug for marketing in 2010, falling 
to a CAGR of 18.8% until 2014. The overall growth rate over this time period was 136%. 
Another contributing factor to the revenue growth is most likely due to the drug’s 
approval for marketing in 2010 by the European Commission after an accelerated 
assessment by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). 
 
 
vii. ERBITUX® 
ERBITUX®, the trade name for cetuximab, was first approved for manufacturing in 
2004 before the FDA granted the drug orphan status and marketing approval in 2006. 
ImClone Systems Incorporated, a subsidiary of Eli Lilly & company, sponsors the drug. 
ERBITUX® treats locally or regionally advanced squamous cell carcinoma of the head 
and neck (SCCHN), the term for head and neck cancer. This type of cancer makes up 3-
5% of all cancers in the U.S. according to the NCI. As indicated on the table below, the 
drug holds two non-orphan indications and its market exclusivity period expired in 2013. 
 
Table 7: Approved Indications for ERBITUX®24 
# Indication for Treatment Indication Approval 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
Start 
Orphan 
Exclusivity 
End 
1 
Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor 
(EGFR); colon cancer 
02/12/2004 N/A N/A 
2 
Squamous cell carcinoma of the head 
and neck (head & neck cancer) 07/03/2000 03/01/2006 03/01/2013 
3 Metastatic head and neck cancer 11/07/2011 N/A N/A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Information regarding approved indications for ERBITUX® was obtained from the 
Orphan Drug Product Designation Database and FDA Drug Approval Database. 
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The graph below shows annual global sales for ERBITUX® from 2004-2014, 
during the period in which the drug held orphan market exclusivity. The CAGR was 
7.5% from 2004-2014 and -0.6% from 2006-2014. The overall growth rate however, was 
121%. 
 
 
 
 
B. METHOD OVERVIEW 
This study conducts a simple difference in differences (DD) analysis using annual 
orphan drug revenues from before and after a change in legislation, i.e. a “treatment” in 
DD model terminology, in order to find the Average Treatment Effect (ATE). The 
revenues are adjusted for inflation by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) produced by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to represent real values in 2014 dollars. In this case, 
the purpose is to isolate the effect of the 1983 ODA on the annual revenues of orphan 
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products and compare the effect on the revenues of the selected orphan drugs described 
earlier. Many of the revenues for orphan products are not published in 10K’s and Annual 
reports if the revenues are insignificant to the company’s overall earnings. Furthermore, 
revenues are generally posted as global sales rather than just U.S. sales. For these 
reasons, this analysis will use global annual revenues of the orphan drug products 
adjusted for inflation, collected through primary source material and the annual reports of 
pharmaceutical companies. 
Looking at revenues before, during, and after the policy changes occurred and 
market exclusivity came into effect can isolate the ATE. The following changes can be 
used to observe the ATE on orphan drug product revenues: 
 
1. Passage of the Orphan Drug Act in 1983 
2. Market exclusivity rights begin for a drug manufacturer 
3. Market exclusivity rights expire for a drug manufacturer 
4. An additional period of market exclusivity begins for a drug manufacturer 
 
On the FDA’s Original New Drug Application (NDA) and Biological Application 
(BLA) approvals database the drugs are given a ranking of 1-10 to describe their NDA 
chemical type. There were only 9 noticeably different drugs approved by the FDA with 
orphan drug status, prior to the orphan drug act in 1983.25 These Orphan Drug approvals 
received 1-New Molecular Entity (NME), 2-New Active Ingredient, or 3-New Dosage 
Form. Of those nine approved orphan drugs, three of them were NME’s. Included in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 These drugs were found through the FDA Approved Drug Database 
57 
 
these orphan drugs by order of approval date was: Leucovorin Calcium, Opana, 
Methotrexate, Numorphan, Fluorouracil, Mucomyst, Sulfamylon, Minocin, and 
Dantrium. There is little record of the revenues for these orphan products prior to 1983 
due to the SEC not requiring this information to be published online until the 1990s. 
Because there are insufficient revenues reported from prior to 1983, that change is not be 
observed in this analysis.  
The analysis focuses specifically on the DDs between only orphan and partial 
orphan products that are described in detail in the previous section. The DD estimates 
observe the change in revenues from before, during, and after market exclusivity periods 
come into effect. The DD estimate is calculated by the following equation: 
 𝛼 = 𝑌!(!!!!!) − 𝑌!(!!!) −    𝑌!(!!!!!) − 𝑌!(!!!)  
Where 𝑌!(!!!!!) represents sales for drug i at year 1+n after the treatment, 𝑌!(!!!) 
represents sales for drug i at year 1 before the treatment, 𝑌!(!!!!!) represents sales for 
drug j at year 1+n after the treatment and 𝑌!(!!!) represents sales for drug j at year 1 
before the treatment. 𝑌! Variables, or the control variables, represent only orphan 
products and 𝑌! variables, or the treatment variables, represent partial orphan products26.  
 
C. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This is with the exception of the DD estimate between TAXOL® and ERBITUX®, 
which are both partial orphans. 
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The summary table below shows the DD between “treatment” and “control” 
orphan drugs at different points in time. 27  Each analysis shows the effect over specific 
time period before, during, or after the FDA grants a market exclusivity period for the 
drug, in order to observe the changes in revenues.28  
 
Table 8: Diff-in-Diff Comparison Summary Table 
                         𝜶 =                𝒀𝒋 = 𝒕 = 𝟏+ 𝒏 − 𝒕 = 𝟏   −   (𝒀𝒊 = 𝒕 = 𝟏+ 𝒏 − (𝒕 = 𝟏)) 
# Diff-in-Diff Treatment Control 
1 -62.2561775 BOTOX (1994) (1991) VPRIV (2014) (2011) 
2 372.8722633 (2004) (2001) (2014) (2011) 
3 -294.661975 
BOTOX 
(1994) (1991) 
FIRAZYR 
(2014) (2011) 
4 140.4664658 (2004) (2001) (2014) (2011) 
5 239.376019 
BOTOX 
(2004) (2001) 
ELAPRASE 
(2010) (2007) 
6 434.19973 (2006) (2001) (2012) (2007) 
7 623.3166229 (2007) (2001) (2013) (2007) 
8 864.2118027 TAXOL (1996) (1993) VPRIV (2014) (2011) 
9 660.9917513 (2000) (1997) (2014) (2011) 
10 631.8060052 TAXOL (1996) (1993) FIRAZYR (2014) (2011) 
11 428.5859537 (2000) (1997) (2014) (2011) 
12 730.7155583 
TAXOL 
(1996) (1993) 
ELAPRASE 
(2010) (2007) 
13 527.4955068 (2000) (1997) (2012) (2007) 
14 498.1075208 
TAXOL 
(1996) (1993) 
ERBITUX 
(2013) (2007) 
15 -190.649356 (2001) (1998) (2010) (2007) 
16 -297.041769 (2005) (2003) (2014) (2012) 
17 1145.757937 GLEEVEC (2005) (2002) ELAPRASE (2010) (2007) 
18 916.7148544 (2010) (2007) (2010) (2007) 
19 1279.254181 GLEEVEC (2005) (2002) VPRIV (2014) (2011) 
20 1050.211099 (2010) (2007) (2014) (2011) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Appendix A for detailed analysis of each DD and Appendix B for a summary table 
of the years from which the revenues for each DD analysis are drawn. 
28 The revenues below are shown  in millions of U.S. dollars and were adjusted for 
inflation using the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
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21 1046.848384 GLEEVEC (2005) (2002) FIRAZYR (2014) (2011) 
22 817.8053013 (2010) (2007) (2014) (2011) 
 
 Estimates (1) and (2) calculate the difference in the changes in revenue of 
BOTOX® and VPRIV® at two points in time. The first looks at the change in revenue 
four years after each product entered its first exclusivity period. In the first  
DD at t=1 BOTOX® and VPRIV® were both only orphan products with marketing 
exclusivity for a single indication that was granted a year earlier. In this estimate 
VPRIV® sales grew by $62 million more than BOTOX® sales. The second estimate 
recalculates the change in revenue four years after BOTOX® entered its second orphan 
exclusivity period. In this estimate, at t=1 VPRIV® and BOTOX® were still only orphan 
products, however at t=4 BOTOX® was a partial orphan. After earning a second orphan 
exclusivity BOTOX® sales grew by $373 million more than VPRIV® sales. Comparing 
the two differences shows that with just a single orphan indication VPRIV® sales 
increased by more than BOTOX® sales, yet once BOTOX® became a partial orphan its 
sales grew at a much faster rate. 
 Estimates (3) and (4) calculate the difference in the changes in revenue of 
BOTOX® and FIRAZYR® at two points in time. Like estimate (1), estimate (3) 
calculates the difference in revenue at t=1, when both drugs were only orphans and were 
granted marketing exclusivity a year earlier, and four years later at t=4. In this estimate 
FIRAZYR® sales grew by $294.7 million more than BOTOX® sales. Like estimate (2), 
estimate (4) recalculates the change after BOTOX® entered its second orphan exclusivity 
period. While at t=1 both drugs were still only orphans, by t=4 BOTOX® became partial 
orphan. In this estimate BOTOX® sales grew by $140.5 million more than VPRIV® 
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sales. Once again, when both products had a single orphan indication, the control drug 
had a larger sales increase than the treatment drug, however after the treatment became a 
“partial orphan, its sales grew at a much faster rate.  
 Estimates (5), (6), and (7), calculate difference in changes in revenue of 
BOTOX® and FIRAZYR® at three points in time. Estimate (5) shows the same effect as 
estimates (2) and (4), calculating the change in revenue four years after ELAPRASE® 
entered its first orphan exclusivity period and four years after BOTOX® entered its 
second orphan exclusivity period. Therefore at t=1 both drugs were only orphans, 
however by t=4 BOTOX® became partial orphan. As a result, BOTOX® sales grew by 
$239.4 million more than VPRIV® sales. Estimate (6) recalculates the difference in the 
changes in revenue of the two drugs when t=6, two years later. At t=6 ELAPRASE® 
was still an only orphan and BOTOX® was a partial orphan. Here, BOTOX® sales grew 
by $434 million more than ELAPRASE® sales. Estimate (7) recalculates the difference 
once again, a year later when t=7. At t=7 ELAPRASE® was still an only orphan and 
BOTOX® was a partial orphan. In this estimate, BOTOX® sales grew by even more, 
reaching $623 million more than ELAPRASE® sales. Comparing the three estimates 
shows that over time BOTOX® sales, or partial orphan sales, grew increasingly larger 
than FIRAZYR® sales, or orphan only sales.  
 Estimates (8) and (9) calculate the difference in changes in revenue of TAXOL® 
and VPRIV® at two points in time. Like previous estimates, estimate (8) looks at the 
change four years after each product entered its first exclusivity period, however at t=1 
TAXOL® held a non-orphan market exclusivity and VPRIV® was an only orphan with 
marketing exclusivity for a single indication granted a year earlier. Here, TAXOL® sales 
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grew by $864 million more than VPRIV® sales. Estimate (9) shows the change four 
years after TAXOL® entered its first orphan exclusivity period, which was actually its 
second exclusivity period since its approval. At t=1 TAXOL® held non-orphan market 
exclusivity and VPRIV® was still an only orphan, however by t=4 TAXOL® was a 
partial orphan. This time TAXOL® sales grew by $661 million more than VPRIV® 
sales. Comparing these estimates shows that during the first and second exclusivity 
periods the treatment drug, TAXOL®, had larger revenue growth than the control, 
VPRIV®. In the second exclusivity period, however, TAXOL® revenues did not grow 
by as much as they did during the first exclusivity period. This is most likely because 
generic manufacturers began to enter the market and produce paclitaxel products in 2000. 
 Estimates (10) and (11) calculate the difference in changes in revenue of 
TAXOL® and FIRAZYR® at two points in time. Like estimate (8), estimate (10) focuses 
on the change after each product entered its first exclusivity period; TAXOL® held non-
orphan market exclusivity and FIRAZYR® was an only orphan that was granted market 
exclusivity a year earlier. Again, TAXOL® sales grew by $631 million more than 
FIRAZYR® sales. Estimate (11) calculates the same effect as estimate (9), when 
TAXOL® entered its second exclusivity period since its approval. At t=4 FIRAZYR® 
was still an only orphan but TAXOL® had become a partial orphan. In this estimate 
TAXOL® sales grew by $428.6 million more than FIRAZYR® sales. Consistent with 
estimates (8) and (9), these estimates show that under the first exclusivity period the 
treatment drug, or partial orphan, had larger revenue growth than the control drug, or 
only orphan. This continued after the second marketing exclusivity, though the revenues 
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of the partial orphan did not grow by as much as they did during the first exclusivity 
period. 
 Estimates (12) and (13) calculate the difference in changes in revenue of 
TAXOL® and ELAPRASE® at two points in time. Estimate (12) looks at the same effect 
as estimates (8) and (10), after each drug entered their first exclusivity period.  In this 
estimate TAXOL® sales grew by $730.7 million more than ELAPRASE® sales. Table 
20 recalculates the change seen in estimates (9) and (11), finding that TAXOL® sales 
grew by $527.5 million more than ELAPRASE® sales. The results of these estimates are 
consistent with the results of the previous estimates with TAXOL® as the treatment drug 
and an only orphan as the control drug.  
 Estimates (14), (15), and (16) calculate the difference in changes in revenue of 
TAXOL® and ERBITUX® at three points in time: before, during and after orphan drug 
market exclusivity. Estimate (14) looks at the same effect as estimates (8), (10), and (12), 
however at t=1neither product had become an orphan drug. Again, TAXOL® held non-
orphan market exclusivity and ERBITUX® did not hold any exclusivity. The estimate 
shows that TAXOL® sales grew by $498 million more than ERBITUX® sales. Estimate 
(15) shows the change over the period that each drug was under its first orphan market 
exclusivity. At t=4, both products were partial orphans. In this estimate, ERBITUX® 
sales grew by $190.6 million more than TAXOL sales. Estimate (16) calculates the 
change in revenue over the period that both orphan exclusivities expired. Both products 
remained partial orphans. In this estimate, ERBITUX® sales grew by $297 million more 
than TAXOL® sales. These estimates show that after being approved for orphan market 
exclusivity the sales of each product declined rather than improved. This also occurred as 
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the drugs were approved for subsequent indications. Comparatively, TAXOL® sales 
declined more. Therefore, the blockbuster product with many indications faced larger 
declines than the drug that never reached blockbuster status and holds fewer indications. 
This could potentially be due to other variables affecting each of the drugs’ markets. 
 Estimates (17) and (18) calculate the difference in changes in revenue of 
GLEEVEC® and ELAPRASE® at two points in time. Estimate (17) looks at the same 
effect observed previously. At t=1 both products held orphan market exclusivity as only 
orphans, however by t=4 GLEEVEC® held overlapping orphan exclusivity periods. As a 
result, GLEEVEC® sales grew by $1145.8 million more than ELAPRASE® sales. 
Estimate (18) calculates the change four years later, showing the change after 
GLEEVEC® became a partial orphan at t=4. In this estimate GLEEVEC® sales grew by 
$916.7 million more than ELAPRASE® sales. These results show that between two only 
orphan products, the drug with multiple approved orphan indications had larger revenue 
growth than the only orphan with a single indication.  After becoming a partial orphan, 
GLEEVEC® sales continued to grow larger than ELAPRASE® sales, although this 
difference had decreased over time.  
 Estimates (19) and (20) calculate the difference in changes in revenue of 
GLEEVEC® and VPRIV® at two points in time. Estimate (19) calculates the same 
change as estimate (17), finding that GLEEVEC® sales grew by $1279 million more than 
VPRIV® sales. Estimate (20) recalculates the same change as estimate (18), finding that 
GLEEVEC® sales grew by $1050 million more than VPRIV® sales. These findings are 
consistent with the results of estimates (17) and (18), with GLEEVEC® as the treatment 
drug and an only orphan as the control drug.  
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 Estimates (21) and (22) calculate the difference in the changes in revenue of 
GLEEVEC® and FIRAZYR® at two points in time. Estimate (21) calculates the same 
effect as estimates (17) and (19), finding that GLEEVEC® sales grew by $1046.8 million 
more than FIRAZYR® sales. Estimate (22) recalculates the same effect as estimate (18) 
and (20), finding that GLEEVEC® sales grew by $817.8 million more than FIRAZYR® 
sales. These findings are consistent with the results of estimates (17), (18), (19), and (20), 
with GLEEVEC® having larger revenue growth than the only orphan drug.  
 
 
D. DISCUSSION 
These results show that the revenues of some orphan products increased more 
after being approved for market exclusivity than others. In the estimates that included a 
partial orphan and only orphan, the partial orphan always had a larger revenue increase. 
These findings suggest that the partial orphans used in this analysis benefitted greater 
from the market exclusivity period. Furthermore, there is a pattern between orphan drugs 
with numerous indications and larger revenues. The largest DDs occurred with 
GLEEVEC®, the drug with the most indications. Based on these estimates, producers of 
partial orphans, especially drugs with many indications, faced larger returns than only 
orphan producers.  
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E. LIMITATIONS 
If these conclusions are extended to the orphan drug market as a whole than it 
would suggest that partial orphan drugs, and drugs with numerous indications, benefit 
greater from the market exclusivity provision granted by the ODA. It must be noted 
however, that there are several limitations of this estimate. First, there is omitted variable 
bias because there are numerous variables that affect orphan drug sales, which are not 
included in this estimate. For example, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the 
estimates between TAXOL® and ERBITUX® because of the exogenous changes 
occurring in each of their markets. TAXOL® faced large revenue declines in 2000 when 
generic competitors entered the market. In the other analyses many of these variables 
cannot be observed. Additionally, common trends assumptions need to be considered. 
This means that other things could change simultaneously as the treatment is 
implemented. While the estimate accounted for inflation using the CPI, other changes 
occurring each year that could impact drug sales were not accounted for. Essentially, any 
omitted variable that correlates with a market exclusivity change and the outcome would 
bias this estimation method. 
By not including variables such as group effects, it is difficult to capture 
differences across groups that are constant over time. If this study were to be performed 
again, comparing orphan only and partial orphan products from the same firm could 
capture these differences. Another limitation of this method includes the underlying year 
effects that were not accounted for. While inflation adjustments were made, because the 
revenues were taken from different years, the method does not capture all of the 
differences over time that could be common among groups. Lastly, this study compares 
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global revenues of orphan products so the revenues do not capture changes in the US 
market specifically. For this reason the study cannot account for policy changes in other 
countries that may impact sales. If this study were to be performed again, it would be 
useful to obtain solely US sales to control for exogenous variables in other markets. 
Another difficulty is that access to orphan drug revenues is very limited. 
Generally, drug manufacturers only distinguish revenues of the most profitable drugs in 
the annual reports. Moreover, revenues of drugs prior to the online SEC filings are even 
harder to locate. Because revenues were collected through primary source data much of 
the data are rounded. Lastly, some of the data included were not obtained from 
pharmaceutical companies themselves, so they may not represent accurate values.  
Given the limited scope of this study, it is difficult to extend these findings to the 
larger orphan drug market. Because of the lack in available data of orphan drug revenues, 
it is difficult to provide an accurate analysis of the sales or profit margins of these drugs 
in the US. A larger sample size comparing the performance of orphan drugs distinguished 
by type would complement this analysis of which orphan products are more successful.  
If these limitations were accounted for, the study could add to the discussion of whether 
the current system achieves the overarching goal of the ODA: to increase the 
development and access of treatments for rare diseases. 
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V. OTHER POLICY SOLUTIONS 
 
It is possible that alternative forms of intellectual property protection could better 
serve innovation and orphan drug development, other than patents or market exclusivity 
periods. However, it is also debated that alternative forms of protection that could 
generate greater competition between pharmaceutical companies, such as compulsory 
licenses or patent reductions, would eliminate incentives to produce orphan drugs that 
created by a patent system. This section will discuss other policy mechanisms that could 
better serve the orphan drug market: patent pools, prizes, grants, and transferrable or 
roaming exclusivity rights. 
 
 
A. PATENT POOLS 
In the pharmaceutical industry, property rights are assigned in the form of patents. 
The difficulty with this system is that it is difficult to transfer these property rights from 
one drug manufacturer to another. For this reason, the system is inefficient because the 
transactions costs pull resources away from drug development and innovation. Ideally, a 
patent pool system would lower transactions costs so that it would be easier to transfer 
ownership or allow a drug manufacturer to license their patents to one another. This 
system reflects the Coase theorem, which Stigler (1996) explains as: 
Under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal.... the 
composition of output will not be affected by the manner in which the law assigns 
liability for damages.... But the costs of this transaction may be prohibitive of 
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getting the people together, of assessing the damages, and so on so only a 
statutory intervention may be feasible (Stigler, 1996). 
Patent pools eliminate transactions costs by facilitating free trade and continuing to 
assign property rights so as a result, perfect competition eliminates the externalities that 
are associated with patents. 
The first record of a modern patent pool was the sewing machine patent pool, 
established in 1856 (Lerner &Tirole, 2004). These allowed the main manufacturers of 
sewing machines to cross-license intellectual property between one another, and resolve 
the litigation issues between them. Lerner & Tirole (2004) define a patent pool as an 
agreement among patent owners to license their patents to each other or third parties. In 
the orphan drug market where underinvestment is more prevalent, this would be 
particularly useful. Pharmaceutical manufacturers could pool their patents making them 
available for licensing by other pharmaceutical manufacturers, non-profits, or generic 
drug makers.  
Proponents of this mechanism believe that patent pools solve the economic costs 
of a system with patents alone. More specifically, in cases where there are overlapping 
patent claims or what is known as a “patent thicket”, or other holdup problems, patent 
pools are especially useful. This system resolves the information disassembly problem by 
allowing innovations to build off of other innovations. The resources being put towards 
licensing transactions and hefty litigation costs associated with patents and market 
exclusivity periods would be reduced. For the orphan drug market in particular, allowing 
the licensing of patents by non-profits or generic drug makers through patent pools would 
widen access to patents, distribute information more quickly, enhance competition, speed 
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up innovation in the orphan drug market, and reduce the monopoly pricing of orphan 
drugs. At the same time, patent pools sustain incentives to develop drugs by continuing to 
allow drug manufacturers to hold patents. Another attractive feature is that they allow 
drug manufacturers to disperse the risk across many players through the licensing of their 
patents.  
Critics of this mechanism argue that there would need to be a set of criteria to 
evaluate the proposed pool, which could be very ambiguous. They believe that patent 
pools would actually increase transactions costs or the litigation costs associated with 
patents and licensing transactions within the members of the pool. They study by Lampe 
& Moser (2010) examines the sewing machine patent pool in 1856 and finds that patent 
pools actually increased the litigation costs in that system. Furthermore, a regulatory 
body would have to ensure that the pool does not reduce competition or social welfare. 
The main concern is that patent pools could pose an anti-trust issue if the members of the 
pool became an oligopoly and made the system worse.  
The study by Lerner & Tirole (2004) finds that allowing members to 
independently license their patents outside of the pool would overcome the anti-trust 
issue and encourage innovation, yet the actual impact on social welfare is difficult to 
determine. They also find that patent pools with complimentary patents, rather than 
substitutes, would encourage more innovation (Lerner &Tirole, 2004). For orphan drugs, 
patents are more often compliments rather than substitutes so this could be particularly 
useful. 
Currently, the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), established in 2010, practices the 
idea of patent pools for drugs. The MPP is backed by the UN and is working to increase 
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access to affordable, quality medicines and technologies of for those affected by HIV in 
developing countries (MPP, 2014). The organization believes that, thus far, they have 
been very successful in increasing access to drugs in developing countries. 
 
 
B. PRIZES 
Prizes are another pull-incentive that award payment after the manufacturer has 
developed the drug, rather than prior to drug development. Unlike research institutions or 
research grants, prizes are granted after private sector R&D has already produced a novel 
discovery. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, this mechanism was often 
used to spark innovation (Hemel et al., 2013). This system incentivizes innovation 
because drug manufacturers compete for the rewards. Antoñanzas et al. (2011) explain 
that under the prize system the innovator of the firm can be rewarded with monetary 
payment, rather than with the right to exclude competition as with a patent system. This 
avoids the dead weight loss that occurs under a patent monopoly or market exclusivity 
system (Hemel et al., 2013). However, depending on the timing that the manufacturer 
receives the funds, prize funds can have different effects. 
There are two main types of prize funds: performance-based and longitudinal 
prizes. Performance-based funds are transferred to the manufacturer incrementally, as the 
drug performs well or has a positive health impact (Hemel et al., 2013). This method 
eliminates the monitoring costs that might occur with grants because manufacturers’ 
incentives are properly aligned with the overall health goal. Furthermore, it reduces 
resource allocation costs because it allows the market decides where they will be most 
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profitable. One example of a performance-based fund is the Health Impact Fund, which 
grants pharmaceutical companies payments based on their assessed global health impact 
(Hemel et al., 2013). In 2009 a fund with a $1.5 billion Advance Market Commitment 
(AMC) was created for pneumococcal vaccines (Hemel et al., 2013). The fund 
guaranteed suppliers a subsidy per vaccine that they sold. Critics of this type of fund 
believe that delaying payments would force potential innovators to rely on outside 
expensive capital in the meantime, and could deter drug manufacturers from participating 
(Hemel et al., 2013). Alternatively, a longitudinal prize is awarded to the manufacturer 
once the R&D project results in an innovation that meets the specifications of the fund, 
before sales are known (Hemel et al., 2013). Unlike performance-based funds, this type 
of prize provides immediate capital rather than delaying the rewards until the future. 
Like each public policy mechanism, there are disadvantages to using prizes. 
Hemel et al. (2013) explain that prize funds, much like R&D grants, pose a budgetary 
cost on the government, and are ultimately funded by taxpayers subsidizing the R&D 
costs. Therefore, the costs do not fall primarily on the users of the patented product, but 
rather are subsidized by both users and non-users. An alternative system, like patents or 
market exclusivity, may be more justified because they are both user-pays systems. The 
difficultly with prizes is determining who carries the cost of the prize and by what criteria 
a prize is justified. The government faces the dilemma of choosing the appropriate size of 
the prize and to whom to grant the prize, so that it will reward the most promising 
projects. Ultimately, they need to establish explicit goals and criteria in order for the prize 
system to be effective. 
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C. PURCHASE GUARANTEES 
Purchase guarantees, or advance purchase agreements, are similar to longitudinal 
prize funds in that they reward payments after the manufacturer has developed the drug 
and before the sales of the drug are recorded. This arrangement establishes funds to 
purchase a pre-specified amount of new vaccine or drug that would meet a given 
indication for a neglected disease (Kremer & Sachs, 1999). They differ from prize funds 
because they give the producer less autonomy in deciding which projects to pursue and 
they target more specified treatments. This method is often proposed to increase private 
sector investment in tropical orphan diseases, or rare diseases that are concentrated in 
low-income populations, because there is little incentive to develop treatments for 
populations that cannot afford them. Purchase guarantees often purchase vaccines, 
because they are a more efficient way to administer the drug to a larger population. One 
proposed fund would grant between $250 and $500 million to purchase new vaccines for 
malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV-AIDs (Kremer, 2001: Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds,). 
This system encourages research, because purchasers commit in advance to 
purchasing a specified amount that will allow a reasonable return on the initial R&D 
investment by firms who successfully developed the product, at a fixed price agreed upon 
in advance (Kremer & Sachs, 1999). This encourages competition and innovation in the 
development process and does not restrict competition once the product has been 
developed. Additionally, having the price established in advance limits firms from 
charging high prices after they develop the drug. Furthermore, purchase guarantees, 
unlike extended exclusivity or transferable priority review rights, would not set a 
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precedent in the incentives for R&D funding in the pharmaceutical industry. It would also 
be possible for drug manufacturers to be rewarded with bonus payments if the product 
surpassed expectations (Kremer & Sachs, 1999). Ultimately, purchase guarantees align 
the interests of the donors funding the purchase, drug manufacturers, their investors, and 
the beneficiaries of the treatment. This is because purchase guarantees allow donors to 
specify their requirements, reduce economic uncertainty for drug manufacturers, provide 
investors with confidence about the expected returns, and raise R&D for low-income 
populations to the level of affluent populations (Berndt & Hurvitz, 2005).  
Critics of purchase guarantees believe that it is difficult to establish the criteria of 
the purchase. There is no formula for how the sponsor and purchaser will agree to set the 
long-term price of the drug, as well as what quantity the sponsor will guarantee to 
provide. Furthermore, there is the option of having a winner take all system or a system 
with multiple winners. The winner take all system makes the purchase streamlined and 
provides the largest incentive, but could also discourage companies from entering if they 
did not expect their product to win (Berndt & Hurvitz, 2005). If purchase guarantees were 
publicly funded, it would be difficult to decide which diseases would be focused on and 
whether that would be the best allocation of resources. Ultimately, resources being used 
to fund one treatment are being taken away from funding another disease. If publicly 
funded, critics could argue that the US should focus on domestic rare diseases rather than 
those prevalent in other countries. 
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D. TRANSFERABLE OR FLOATING EXCLUSIVITY RIGHTS 
A system with transferrable or floating exclusivity rights would allow drug 
sponsors to hold an intellectual monopoly or exclusivity for a specified period of time. 
Unlike the system in the US, there would be the possibility that the period be shortened 
or extended.  
The European Union (EU) has a system where patents can be overturned due to 
lack of inventiveness and market exclusivity periods can be shortened if the drug no 
longer meets the original designation criteria for an orphan product. In 2000 the European 
Union’s Orphan Drug Regulation’s became effective. To obtain ODE designation in the 
EU, the drug must be (Regulation No. 141/2000, 1999):  
1. Intended to diagnose, prevent, or treat a life-threatening or serious condition 
either: 
a. Affecting no greater than five in 10,000 people in the EU; or 
b. Without incentive would probably not be marketed due to the low 
probability that marketing the drug would generate a sufficient 
return 
2. There must not be another satisfactory method of diagnosis, prevention, or 
treatment in the EU.  Otherwise, the product should be of significant benefit to 
those affected by the condition (Regulation No. 141/2000. (1999). 
Like US orphan drug regulations, the EU regulations establish incentives that encourage 
R&D of orphan drugs. Exclusivity is generally granted for ten years, but may be extended 
to twelve or reduced to six if the drug no longer satisfies the ODE criteria at the end of 
the fifth year. This is meant to resolve the issues of having a product so profitable that the 
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continued exclusivity is not justified. This system could be advantageous in the U.S., 
because in circumstances where the drug has outperformed its expectations, the 
government would have the right to end its exclusivity period, or in circumstances where 
the drug has underperformed, exclusivity could be extended. 
 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In a market where first mover advantages are small, it is difficult to find the 
appropriate incentive system. The system created by the ODA has led to an increase in 
the development, approval, and availability of orphan products. While the market 
exclusivity provision has expanded access to orphan drugs, it may be erroneously 
providing exclusive market protection for other products.  
Through the case study analysis and difference-in-difference methods used in this 
thesis, it appears that partial orphan products with multiple indications have performed 
better under the ODA incentive system than only orphan products. Due to the limited 
scope of this study, it is difficult to extend these findings to the orphan drug market as a 
whole. A larger sample size of orphan drug revenues from the US throughout the 20th and 
early 21st century would provide better analysis of the ATE resulting from market 
exclusivity and the incentives under the ODA.  
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Some of the policy mechanisms observed in this paper may better align the 
incentives of the ODA with the incentives of drug manufacturers; however whether an 
alternative form of protection should be explored, remains to be seen. When deciding 
how to allocate the costs of orphan drug development the question that needs to be asked 
is: who should assume the responsibility of orphan drugs? As discussed in this paper, 
each system has specific costs and benefits. Whenever funds are allocated towards 
orphan products, they are simply being re-allocated from the development of other drugs. 
Policy solutions seem to attempt to provide orphan drug incentives without sacrificing 
competition and innovation incentives. If history is any indication, it is very unlikely that 
there will be any reductions to market exclusivity periods or patent terms because the 
industry would be moving in the opposite direction that it has moved for decades, and 
would face strong opposition from pharmaceutical lobbyists and vocal patient advocacy 
groups. 
The results of this study call into question the ODA and whether it is truly the best 
incentive system to serve the ultimate goal of increased availability and access to orphan 
pharmaceuticals.  Although an incentive system that finds the perfect balance between 
the costs and benefits described in this paper may be impossible to achieve, a practical 
goal is to find the least harmful solution.  
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VII. APPENDIX 
	  
APPENDIX A: The table below shows the calculations of each difference and difference 
analysis that appear in Table 8: Diff-in-Diff Comparison Summary Table. 
	  
Diff-in-Diff analysis of BOTOX (Treatment) and VPRIV (Control) 
 t=4  t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 21.90068722  56.70801619 34.80732897 
Year (1994)  (1991)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 366.7  269.636493 97.06350655 
Year (2014)  (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)   -62.25617758 
Diff-in-Diff analysis of BOTOX (Treatment) and VPRIV (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 883.655657 413.719887 469.9357699 
Year (2004) (2001)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 366.7 269.636493 97.06350655 
Year      (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  372.8722633 
Diff-in-Diff analysis BOTOX (Treatment) and FIRAZYR (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference 
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 21.90068722 56.70801619 34.80732897 
Year (1994) (1991)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 364.2 34.7306959 329.4693041 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶) -294.6619751 
Diff-in-Diff analysis BOTOX (Treatment) and FIRAZYR (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference 
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 883.655657 413.719887 469.9357699 
Year (2004) (2001)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 364.2 34.7306959 329.4693041 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  140.4664658 
Diff-in-Diff analysis BOTOX (Treatment) and ELAPRASE (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference 
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 883.655657 413.719887 469.93577 
Year (2004) (2001)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 438.1748248 207.6150738 230.559751 
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Year (2010) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  239.376019 
Diff-in-Diff analysis BOTOX (Treatment) and ELAPRASE (Control) 
 t=6 t=1 Difference 
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 1153.383429 413.719887 739.6635416 
Year (2006) (2001)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 513.0788853 207.6150738 305.4638115 
Year (2012) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  434.19973 
Diff-in-Diff analysis BOTOX (Treatment) and ELAPRASE (Control) 
 t=7 t=1 Difference 
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 1383.872093 413.719887 970.1522056 
Year (2007) (2001)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 554.4506566 207.6150738 346.8355828 
Year (2013) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  623.3166229 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and VPRIV (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 1226.681759 265.4064498 961.2753093 
Year (1996) (1993)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 366.7 269.636493 97.06350655 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  864.2118027 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and VPRIV (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 2146.021463 1387.966206 758.0552578 
Year (2000) (1997)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 366.7 269.636493 97.06350655 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  660.9917513 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and FIRAZYR (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 1226.681759 265.4064498 961.2753093 
Year (1996) (1993)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 364.2 34.7306959 329.4693041 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  631.8060052 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and FIRAZYR (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 2146.021463 1387.966206 758.0552578 
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Year (2000) (1997)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 364.2 34.7306959 329.4693041 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  428.5859537 
 Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and ELAPRASE (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 1226.681759 265.4064498 961.2753093 
Year (1996) (1993)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 438.1748248 207.6150738 230.559751 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  730.7155583 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and ELAPRASE (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 2146.021463 1387.966206 758.0552578 
Year (2000) (1997)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 438.1748248 207.6150738 230.559751 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  527.4955068 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and ERBITUX (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 1226.68179 265.406448 961.2753093 
Year (1996) (1993)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 790.261991 327.094206 463.1677885 
Year (2007) (2004)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  498.1075208 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and ERBITUX (Control) 
 t=1 t=4 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 1486.45074 1748.65119 -262.2004166 
Year (2001) (1998)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 718.710937 790.261997 -71.55106047 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  -190.6493561 
Diff-in-Diff analysis TAXOL (Treatment) and ERBITUX (Control) 
 t=3 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 905.487923 1201.69252 -296.2045955 
Year (2005) (2003)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 723 723.837174 0.837174 
Year (2014) (2012)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  -297.0417695 
Diff-in-Diff analysis GLEEVEC (Treatment) and ELAPRASE (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
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Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 2630.4 1254.082312 1376.317688 
Year (2005) (2002)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 438.1748248 207.6150738 230.559751 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  1145.757937 
Diff-in-Diff analysis GLEEVEC (Treatment) and ELAPRASE (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 4630.365778 3483.091172 1147.274605 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 438.1748248 207.6150738 230.559751 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  916.7148544 
 Diff-in-Diff analysis GLEEVEC (Treatment) and VPRIV (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 2630.4 1254.082312 1376.317688 
Year (2005) (2002)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 366.7 269.636493 97.06350655 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  1279.254181 
Diff-in-Diff analysis GLEEVEC (Treatment) and VPRIV (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 4630.365778 3483.091172 1147.274605 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 366.7 269.636493 97.06350655 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  1050.211099 
Diff-in-Diff analysis GLEEVEC (Treatment) and FIRAZYR (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 2630.4 1254.082312 1376.317688 
Year (2005) (2002)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 364.2 34.7306959 329.4693041 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  1046.848384 
Diff-in-Diff analysis GLEEVEC (Treatment) and FIRAZYR (Control) 
 t=4 t=1 Difference  
Treatment (𝒀𝒋) 4630.365778 3483.091172 1147.274605 
Year (2010) (2007)  
Control (𝒀𝒊) 364.2 34.7306959 329.4693041 
Year (2014) (2011)  
Difference-in-Differences (𝜶)  817.8053013 
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VIII. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): An application for a generic drug. Only 
requires sponsor to show bioequivalence and does not require preclinical and clinical data 
to establish safety and effectiveness (FDA, 2012). 
 
Active Moiety/Ingredient: The part of a drug responsible for the way in which it works 
(FDA, 2012).  
Bioequivalence: Performs in the same manner as the original drug, under the same 
conditions (OTA, 1993) 
Blockbuster drug: A drug that generates more than $1billion US dollars in revenue 
annually (Hannigan et al., 2013). 
Brand/Trade Name: The commercial name for a drug provided by its sponsor for 
marketing purposes (OTA, 1993). 
 
Center for Research and Drug Evaluation (CDRE) 
 
Clinical Superiority: A drug that is safer, more effective or significantly more 
convenient than previously (CFR, 2014). 
 
Clinical Trials: Procedures with human subjects under controlled situations meant to 
establish a drug’s safety and effectiveness (OTA, 1993). 
 
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
Difference-in-Differences (DD) 
 
Drug Lag: Time until a drug is able to reach the market (Henninger, 2002). 
 
Drug Loss: Time during which less new drugs are created (Henninger, 2002). 
 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act of 1938 
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
 
Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997 
 
Generic Drug: comparable to a brand drug in dosage form, strength, administration, 
quality and performance characteristics, and intended use (FDA, 2012). 
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Market Exclusivity: The exclusive right to market a particular drug. 
 
“Me-too” drug: Incremental advances on existing NCE that are similar but not identical 
in terms of molecular structure and the way they work (OTA, 1993). 
 
Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) 
 
National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
 
National Institutes of Health (NIH): Medical research agency supporting scientific 
studies (NIH, 2014). 
 
National Organization for Rare Disorders (NORD): Provides information about 
diseases, patient organizations, patient assistance programs, research grants and 
fellowships, and advocacy on public policy issues (NORD). 
 
New Drug Application (NDA): An application containing detailed data that is submitted 
to FDA for review for marketing approval in the US (FDA, 2012). 
 
New Molecular Entity (NME) or New Chemical Entity (NCE): An active ingredient 
or innovative product serving a previously unmet medical need that has never been 
marketed in the US (FDA, 2012). 
 
Office of Orphan Products Development (OOPD) 
 
Only Orphan: Drugs that are only approved for one or more orphan indication. 
 
Orphan Designation: The drug meets the requirements of the FDA for orphan 
designation and the sponsor is awarded the privileges under the ODA and similar 
legislation (CFR, 2014). 
 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA) of 1983 
 
Orphan Drug Entity (ODE): drugs intended to treat diseases and conditions affecting 
200,000 or fewer Americans, or for which the sales in the United States are not 
reasonably expected to cover the drug manufacturer’s cost of research and development 
for the drug (CFR, 2014) 
 
Orphan Indication: The use of a drug for treating a particular orphan disease (CFR, 
2014). 
 
“Orphaned”: When a pharmaceutical product is ignored. 
 
Over the Counter (OTC) 
 
Partial Orphan: Drugs that are approved for both orphan and non-orphan indications. 
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Patent Pool: An agreement among patent owners to license their patents to each other or 
third parties (Lerner & Tirole, 2004) 
 
Priority Review Drug: Granted for a drug that appears to represent an advance over 
available therapy (FDA, 2012). 
 
Prizes: Award payments to the drug manufacturer after they have produced the drug. 
 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
 
Push Incentives: Reward the research inputs, namely the R&D spending, by drug 
manufacturers (Mueller-Langer, 2013). 
 
Pull Incentives: Reduce the risk and increasing the returns to pharmaceutical product 
development (Mueller-Langer, 2013). 
 
Rare disease or condition: “any disease or condition that affects fewer than 200,000 
persons in the United States” (FD&C, 1938). 
 
Real Dollars: Expressed in terms of purchasing power during a benchmark year. Adjusts 
for changes in buying power due to inflation or deflation (OTA, 1993) 
 
Research & Development (R&D): The process of developing and discovering a drug or 
to sell on the market (OTA, 1993) 
 
“Salami Slicing”: filing for orphan drug status for a small treatment population and later 
adding new orphan designations for different applications of the drug. 
 
US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
Standard Review Drug: Has therapeutic qualities similar to those of an already 
marketed drug (FDA, 2012) 
 
Therapeutic Class: Drugs intended to treat a particular disease or group of related 
diseases (OTA, 1993) 
 
Therapeutic Equivalence (TE): Drugs that are both bioequivalent and pharmaceutical 
equivalents (FDA, 2012) 
 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
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